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Abstract 
 
In social interactions it is important for perceivers to be able to differentiate between 
facial expressions of emotion associated with a congruent emotional experience 
(genuine expressions) and those that are not (posed expressions). This research 
investigated the sensitivity of participants with a range of depressive symptom 
severity and varying levels of rumination to the differences between genuine and 
posed facial expressions The suggested mechanisms underlying impairments in 
emotion recognition were also investigated; the effect of cognitive load (as a 
distraction from deliberate processing of stimuli) and attention, and the relationships 
between mechanisms and sensitivity across a range of depressive symptoms and 
level of rumination. Participants completed an emotion categorisation task in which 
they were asked if targets were showing either happiness or sadness, and then if 
targets were feeling those emotions. Participants also completed the same task under 
cognitive load. In addition, a recognition task was used to measure attention. Results 
showed that when making judgements about whether targets were feeling sad lower 
sensitivity was related to higher levels of depressive symptoms, but contrary to 
predictions, only when under cognitive load.   Depressive symptoms and rumination 
were not related to higher levels of bias towards sad expressions. Recognition did not 
show a relationship with sensitivity, rumination or depression scores. Cognitive load 
did not show the expected effects or improving sensitivity but instead showed lower 
sensitivity scores in some conditions compared to conditions without load. 
Implications of results are discussed, as well as directions for future research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The identification of emotion plays an important role in ensuring successful 
interactions in the social environment and impairments in the recognition of emotion 
have been associated with impairments in social behaviour (Leppenen & Hietanen, 
2001). Depression is a disorder characterised by social dysfunction and individuals 
experiencing the disorder have been shown to have difficulties in identifying facial 
expressions of emotion (Gur, Erwin, Gur, Zwil, Heimberg, & Kraemer, 1992; Hale, 
1998; Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Persad & Polivy, 1993; Surguladze et al., 2004). 
Rumination, associated with depression, has also been associated with impairments 
in emotion recognition (Johnston, Carter & McLellan, in press; Raes, Hermans, & 
Williams, 2006). Rumination is a response to the experience of depressive symptoms 
(Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and it 
is theorised that this relationship itself impacts social judgements. It has been 
suggested that these impairments are related to a mood congruence effect, and that 
those diagnosed with depression attend more to negative stimuli which is associated 
with their underlying mood state (Persad & Polivy, 1993). Alternatively it has been 
hypothesised that those experiencing states of sadness (including chronic states), 
have impairments in the manner they process non-verbal information (Ambady & 
Gray, 2002).  Further investigation of the mechanisms underlying emotion 
recognition deficits in individuals with depression and who engage in rumination will 
be useful to understand the associated social dysfunction.  
One aspect of fundamental importance to functional emotion recognition has 
received little research attention, that is, the ability to recognise the actual underlying 
emotional experience of other people. People have the ability to separate their 
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underlying emotional experience from their outward expression of such experiences. 
Therefore individuals need to be sensitive to the differences between genuine facial 
expressions of emotion (displays associated with the congruent underlying emotional 
experience of a person) and posed expressions (displays not associated with the 
corresponding emotional state of a person), as these expressions contain information 
which perceivers can use to inform their behaviour in social interactions. The 
purpose of the present research was to contribute to the existing knowledge about 
emotion recognition in depression and rumination by examining sensitivity to the 
differences between genuine and posed facial expressions. The following sections of 
the present introduction will firstly outline the role of emotion recognition in social 
interactions. The state of current research relating to emotion recognition in 
individuals with depressive symptoms and associated ruminative processing styles 
will then be presented.  The introduction will then outline the importance of 
considering the implications of differentiating between genuine and posed facial 
expressions.   
 
1.1 Emotion Recognition and its Role in Social Interactions 
The emotional experience of humans is seen as being varied and complex. 
While the emotional experience of the individual has been defined in different ways, 
the experience of emotion can be described broadly as the perception of a meaningful 
world that the perceiver is called to act upon (Frijida, 1986). Emotional experience is 
seen as an integral way in which people navigate their social environment. Emotions 
are regarded as strong regulators of both intrapersonal and interpersonal behaviour 
(Denham, McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990).  Emotions are thought to be 
essentially automatic, involuntary, and quick reactions that help people interact in 
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their social relationships, helping to regulate and maintain these relationships 
(Keltner & Haidt, 1999).  Social theories of the function of emotions make the 
assumption that people are social creatures, and therefore encounter issues related to 
survival in their relationships (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Social interactions are highly 
important to humans and navigating the social environment successfully is a way to 
ensure positive outcomes for survival. Emotion recognition has been extensively 
studied in the literature in relation to the important role it plays in the social 
interactions of humans; being able to accurately identify emotions expressed by 
another is one of the abilities needed for successful social interaction (Blair, 2003; 
Matsumoto et. al, 2008).  It is theorised that expressions of emotion aid individuals to 
know the emotions, beliefs and intentions of others; this information is then used to 
facilitate successful social interactions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999).  
Emotion can be expressed through different mediums and there has been an 
interest in the expression of emotion through various facial, vocal and postural 
channels. There has been a particular focus on emotion conveyed thorough facial 
expressions. The nature of the face, in that it is highly visible and dynamic makes it 
an accessible and efficient medium for communicating emotion (Buck, 1994, Frijda 
& Mesquita, 1994).  The ability to recognise facial expressions is important as these 
expressions provide information about emotions, intentions, and relationships with 
the perceiver and the environment (Matsumoto et. al, 2008).  The ability to recognise 
displays of facial expressions of emotions has been shown to be almost universal 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1971, Ekman et al., 1987). This universal recognition has been 
demonstrated by showing that perceivers in one culture perform at better than chance 
levels when identifying emotions displayed by members of another culture (Ekman 
et al., 1987). Ekman and colleagues (1987) completed research in 10 different 
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countries and in 8 different languages; two of the countries included, Japan and 
Sumatra, are known to have significantly different attitudes to emotional expression 
than Western cultures. Due to the important social function of emotional expression, 
the universal ability to recognise facial expressions of emotions demonstrates that 
perceivers are able to use this skill to aid in successful social interactions.  
Prototypical facial expressions are expressions associated with the experience 
of certain emotions, often termed basic emotions (e.g. happiness, anger, sadness, 
fear, surprise). However, as discussed facial expressions of emotions can 
communicate to the perceiver more than just the associated emotion. Facial 
expressions may not always be related to a congruent affective state. A facial 
expression of one emotion may be a mask for other underling emotions, or a more 
neutral mode state (Ekman, Friesen, & O‟Sullivan, 1988).  One way to consider this 
distinction is by labelling facial expressions of emotion associated with the 
corresponding emotional experience as genuine expressions, and those expressions 
not associated with a congruent experience of emotion as posed expressions. 
 
1.2 Depressive Symptoms and Emotion Recognition 
Depression is a disorder characterised by affective disturbances, 
predominantly low mood and loss of pleasure in activities (anhedonia) (Felician & 
Arean, 2007). Depression as a disorder involves the experience of depressive 
episodes, in which depressive symptoms are actively experienced. The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) criteria for a Major Depressive Episode outlines the symptoms 
associated with depressive episodes and when these symptoms are at a level of 
severity that they qualify for a formal diagnosis. The criteria for a Major Depressive 
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Episode outline that individuals must experience depressed mood most of the day 
and/or anhedonia and five or more of the following symptoms present nearly every 
day for at least two weeks, representing a change in functioning: 1) Significant 
weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (a change of more than 5% of body 
weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite; 2) Insomnia or hypersomnia; 
3) Psychomotor agitation or retardation (observable by others); 4) Fatigue or loss of 
energy; 5) Feelings of worthlessness, or excessive or inappropriate guilt; 6) 
Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness; 7) Recurrent thoughts 
of death, recurrent suicidal ideation, or suicide attempts or a specific plan for 
committing suicide.  
While a diagnosis of a depressive disorder is made according to the DSM-IV-
TR guidelines, depressive symptoms can be measured as dimensional constructs 
using psychometric measures. Such measures indicate the presence of symptoms and 
the severity of those symptoms in individuals without assigning a diagnosis. A 
diagnosis of depression indicates that depressive symptoms experienced by an 
individual are at a level of severity that causes significant impairments in the life of 
that individual. This current research is focused on symptoms of depression currently 
experienced by individuals, rather than focusing solely on a population which has a 
diagnosis attached to their symptoms. In examining depressive symptoms along a 
continuum, trends concerning increasing severity of symptoms can be observed.  
Depression as a disorder is characterised by social dysfunction, as those 
experiencing depressive symptoms will often withdraw from social activities 
(Felician & Arean, 2007), leading to social isolation.  As discussed emotion 
recognition has been shown to be important for successful social functioning and the 
relationship between depressive symptoms and emotional recognition has been an 
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area of interest. Research into emotion recognition has found impairments in this 
area are related to impaired social functioning (Leppenen & Hietanen, 2001), 
suggesting that it may be important to consider emotion recognition skills in 
populations experiencing difficulties in social functioning. Previous studies in the 
area of depression and emotion recognition have often examined two different 
populations, those with a clinical diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder (which can 
be the presence of a single depressive episode, or recurrent episodes) and currently 
experiencing symptoms, or those experiencing symptoms of depression without a 
diagnosis.   
Compared to healthy controls, individuals with a diagnosis of depression 
have been shown to be less accurate in recognising facial expressions of emotions 
(Persad & Polivy, 1993). Studies have reported that those experiencing depressive 
symptoms are found not to be impaired in all areas of emotion recognition, but more 
specifically show a negative bias when judging facial expressions (Gur, et al., 1992; 
Hale, 1998). For example those with diagnosed with depression have shown a 
tendency to categorise neutral facial expressions as being sad expressions and 
expressions of happiness as being neutral expressions (Gur et al., 1992). Individuals 
diagnosed with depression have also shown an attentional bias towards sad 
expressions (Gotlib et al., 2004). When presented with a neutral and a sad face, those 
diagnosed with depression were shown to selectively attend to the sad face, whereas 
non-psychiatric controls did not show this selective attention to sadness. These 
findings are clinically significant to the course of depression as greater perception of 
negative emotions have been associated with poorer depression outcomes (Bouhuys, 
Geerts, & Gordijin, 1999; Geerts & Bouhuys, 1998; Hale, 1998). 
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Much of the previous research has used prototypical facial expressions of 
emotions (highly recognisable expressions that are associated with specific emotions) 
that were typically posed. However, everyday perceivers may be exposed to a range 
of facial expressions, expressions of different intensities of an emotion, different 
aspects of the same emotion, or expressions that communicate different information. 
Research using prototypical facial expressions can only provide so much of an 
understanding of emotional processing in those experiencing depression symptoms. 
In order to gain a fuller understanding of impairments in emotional processing, 
research needs to consider aspects of emotion recognition other than the recognition 
of prototypical expressions. Individuals diagnosed with depression have been shown 
to require greater intensity of an expression to be able to identify it as being happy 
than healthy controls (Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Surguladze et al., 2004). 
Surguladze and colleagues (2004) used faces morphed to show 50% intensity of 
emotional expression as well as 100% intensity expressions to study the ability of 
perceivers to identify less intense expressions. Compared with healthy controls those 
diagnosed with depression were less accurate in identifying the 50% intensity happy 
expressions as being happy. However, this study was conducted using computer 
morphed faces, which display expressions that are unlikely to be experienced during 
a real world social interaction. In summary previous research has shown that 
individuals experiencing depressive symptoms show an increased bias towards 
identifying expressions as sad and difficulty interpreting lower intensity positive 
emotion in facial expressions.  
In many of the studies described above the ability of participants to label 
basic emotions displayed by facial expressions has been the focus of investigation. 
While recognising that certain facial expressions are associated with a corresponding 
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emotion is important for social interaction, there are other aspects of emotion 
recognition that are important for social functioning. Research needs to address the 
other aspects by using more ecologically relevant stimuli which could be 
encountered by perceivers in a social interaction, something lacking in the previous 
research methodology. The use of more ecologically relevant stimuli can allow for a 
better examination of impairments as they may elicit closer approximations to 
perceiver behaviour in the social environment. 
  
1.3 Rumination Associated with Depression and Emotion Recognition 
An important consideration in individuals experiencing symptoms of 
depression is the way in which a person responds to a depressive episode. A 
ruminative cognitive response style, referred to commonly as rumination or 
depressive rumination, is often engaged in by those as a response to the experience of 
symptoms of depression (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination as a response style is characterised by self focused 
attention on the negative aspects of one‟s self or life, repetitive thinking about one‟s 
negative emotions, and worrying about the causes and consequences of depressive 
symptoms, without any action to alleviate these symptoms (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination can be described as 
a style of analytical thinking, in that those engaging in rumination are preoccupied 
with passively analysing the causes of their depressive symptoms. A commonly used 
measure of rumination is the Ruminative subscale of Response Styles Questionnaire 
(RSQ-R; Nolen- Hoeksema, 1991). The RSQ-R has frequently been used in 
experimental studies to measure levels of rumination.  
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Rumination as a response style leads to the maintenance or increased severity 
of depressive symptoms (Grassia & Gibb, 2008; Nolen-Hoesksema, Morrow, & 
Fredrickson, 1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). Individuals engaging in 
depressive rumination experience more depressive symptoms, a higher frequency of 
depressive episodes, longer episodes of depression and face a greater risk for future 
episodes of depression (Matheson & Anisman, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). Rumination has 
therefore been shown to significantly affect the experience of depressive symptoms.  
Rumination is a cognitive process often associated with depressive symptoms and as 
it involves a preoccupation with negative emotions, it requires further consideration 
in regard to emotion recognition deficits. Rumination has been associated with a 
general negative effect on social skills. It has been shown that rumination leads to 
less effective interpersonal problem solving, and a bias towards negative information 
from interpersonal stories (Lyubomirsky & Nolen Hoeksema, 1995). This difficulty 
with problem solving has been theorised to be related to the poorer depression 
outcomes that are seen in those who engage in high levels of rumination. 
Higher levels of rumination (in those diagnosed with depression) have been 
associated with higher levels of perception of negative emotion in schematic facial 
expressions (Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006). This effect still proved significant 
even when levels of depression, anxiety and dysfunctional attitudes were controlled 
for. The authors theorise that the attentional biases of depressive rumination are the 
causal mechanism behind biases in the perception of facial expressions in those with 
depressive symptoms. In line with theories that biases of attention are associated with 
emotion recognition difficulties, rumination was suggested as the process behind 
these biases. Rumination influences the focus of the individual and the analytical 
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thinking associated with it may affect the interpretation of information, and in turn 
the meaning of stimuli may be interpreted more negatively (Raes, Hermans, & 
Williams, 2006). Johnston, Carter and McLellan (in press) investigated whether 
sensitivity to differences between genuine (associated with a congruent underlying 
emotional state) and posed (not associated with a corresponding emotional state) 
facial expressions of happiness and sadness was related to rumination and depressive 
symptoms. The authors found that perceivers with higher levels of depressive 
symptoms were not more biased towards negative expressions, or more sensitive to 
the underlying emotion of sadness. The authors instead found higher bias scores for 
expressions of happiness than sadness across participants. However, higher 
rumination scores were associated with lower sensitivity and higher bias to 
expressions of sadness, when asked if expressions displayed sadness, rather than 
when asked if targets were actually feeling sad. This finding indicates that a 
relationship exists between level of rumination and sensitivity to genuine and posed 
facial expressions of emotion. There were no significant correlations with depression 
scores, although correlations with rumination were no longer significant once the 
effect of depression scores were partialled out. This finding indicates that there may 
be an interaction between rumination and depressive symptoms in relation to 
emotion sensitivity. The authors noted that the sample used had an overall low level 
of depressive symptoms and further research is needed to investigate whether the 
same pattern of results would be seen with individuals with a range of severity of 
depressive symptoms. A larger range including those with more severe depressive 
symptoms, would allow for the examination of the extent of perceiver sensitivity. 
With a wider range of symptoms the relationship between depression, rumination 
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and any interactions that exist in regards to emotion sensitivity could be more fully 
investigated.  
 Rumination associated with depressive symptoms has been shown to have an 
effect on emotion recognition, and there is a suggestion that level of rumination also 
has an effect on the ability to judge affective state. As rumination and depressive 
symptoms have been shown to be highly correlated, the interactive effect between 
these two variables is an important factor to consider in emotion sensitivity research. 
By examining these two factors together, the effect of their relationship can be seen 
in relation to emotion sensitivity.   
 
1.4 Mechanisms Related to Impairments in Emotion Recognition 
It has been suggested by previous research that the underlying impairments 
related to emotion sensitivity in those with depressive symptoms are an issue of 
attention. It has been theorised it may be a lack of attention to certain emotional 
stimuli and a preoccupation with negative feelings, which leads to less attention 
being paid to certain stimuli in the social environment (Persad & Polivy, 1993).  
Individuals with depressive symptoms or a diagnosis of depression have also been 
shown to display what is described as an attentional bias towards negative 
expressions over other expressions, particularly sadness (e.g. Gotlib et al., 2004). 
This suggests that the underlying mechanism behind poor emotion sensitivity is 
selective attention, due to the mood state of the individual. Individuals with 
depressive symptoms may attend less to positive emotions (such as happiness) and 
more to negative emotions (such as sadness). This bias is theorised to be related to 
mood congruency, in which perceivers tend to make judgements which are related to 
their underlying affective state (Ambady & Gray, 2002). The selective attention 
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towards negative expressions could be driven by rumination (Raes, Hermans, & 
Williams, 2006), in that individuals have an internal analytical focus on depressive 
symptoms and this in turn drives attention when interpreting facial expressions of 
emotion.  
Another suggested mechanism behind impaired processing of facial 
expressions of emotion, is the information processing strategy of individuals 
experiencing depressive symptoms. As reviewed by Ambady and Gray (2002) both 
transient and chronic sadness have been found to be characterised by a deliberative 
processing strategy. A deliberate processing strategy is characterised by the 
conscious and intentional processing of information. As a major feature of a 
depressive disorder is chronic low mood or sadness, this deliberate processing style 
could also apply to those experiencing depressive symptoms. Ambady and Gray 
(2002) suggested that in social situations the decoding of non-verbal behaviour (e.g. 
facial expressions of emotion) by perceivers is better viewed as an automatic process 
meeting many of the automatic processing criteria: it occurs outside awareness 
(Dimberg, Thunberg & Elmehed, 2000; LeDoux, 1996; Niedenthal, 1990), and 
without intention (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al., 2000; Dimberg & 
Petterson, 2000). It is also theorised that intentional or deliberate processing of social 
information may in fact be detrimental to the accuracy of social judgements 
(Ambady & Gray, 2002). Ruminative cognitive style may be associated with this 
deliberative processing strategy, as individuals are already engaging in an analytical 
cognitive style in relation to their depressive symptoms. Individuals engaging in high 
levels of rumination may show similar patterns as those experiencing states of 
sadness, as rumination has also been associated with deficits in social decision 
making (Lyubomirsky & Nolen Hoeksema, 1995).  
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In recognising facial expressions of emotion, a deliberate processing style 
may reduce the efficiency in which this information is processed. Engaging in a 
distracting task (i.e. a cognitive load) while completing a social judgement task has 
been found to improve the accuracy of those with induced sad mood (Ambady & 
Gray, 2002). This finding appears to reflect that when participants were distracted 
and possibly more likely to be employing an automatic processing style, their 
accuracy in making social judgements improved. With regard to participants without 
depressive symptoms, they have been shown to accurately recognise facial 
expressions of emotion under a cognitive load, showing only slight differences in 
accuracy for some emotions without a cognitive load (Tracy & Robins, 2008).  
Processing style could therefore be a possible mechanism behind the impaired 
recognition of facial expressions, in those with depressive symptoms and who 
engage in rumination. 
 
1.5 The Case of Posed and Genuine Emotions 
Ekman, Friesen and O‟Sullivan (1988) reported that people can at least 
partially separate their underlying experience of emotion from an outward expression 
visible to others. This finding indicates that an individual may experience an emotion 
without outwardly expressing it in a facial expression, or express an emotion without 
the accompanying emotional experience. Facial expressions being either associated 
with a congruent emotional experience, or a non- congruent emotional experience 
forms the basic distinction between genuine and posed expressions of emotions. 
Terms also used to refer to genuine and posed expressions include felt and unfelt 
expressions of emotions, and involuntary and voluntary expressions.   
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Posed and genuine expressions of emotion differ at a neurological level as it 
has been found that different pathways in the brain are activated when displaying 
either a genuine or posed expression. The activation of older subcortical neural 
pathways is involved in the creation of genuine expressions of emotions (Damasio, 
1994; Gazzaniga & Smylie 1990). While posed expressions of emotion involve the 
activation of the more recently developed motor cortex (Damasio, 1994; Gazzaniga & 
Smylie 1990). These differences have been observed in stroke patients. Patients who 
have sustained damage in areas associated with older neural pathways show 
asymmetry in involuntary (genuine) facial expressions, but not in voluntary (posed) 
expressions; patients with damage to the motor cortex show the opposite pattern 
(Damasio, 1994).  This differential activation is an indication that genuine and posed 
expressions occur in different contexts, and therefore communicate different 
information.  
Both posed and genuine expressions are important in social perception, 
providing perceivers with different information for social interaction. While a 
genuine smile is an expression of happiness or enjoyment, a posed smile can be 
disguising other feelings or a neutral mood state (Ekman, Friesen, & O‟Sullivan, 
1988; Gosselin, Warren & Diotte, 2002). Illustrating that while an individual 
presenting a genuine smile has an underlying emotional state of happiness, this 
cannot be said for someone presenting a posed smile. The difference between the 
underlying mood state associated with posed and genuine expressions has 
consequences for the interaction between the perceiver and the individual displaying 
these expressions. A person displaying a genuine smile is experiencing happiness 
and affords differing opportunities for further interaction than a person displaying a 
posed smile. A genuine smile is an indication that cooperative behaviour may be 
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engaged in with the individual displaying the expression (Owren & Bachorowski, 
2001), a posed smile is not associated with the opportunity for such behaviour. 
Considering sadness, genuine expressions are associated with feelings of sadness, 
which may elicit sympathy or comfort from others. While posed expressions of 
sadness may be an attempt to elicit such sympathy or comfort from others without 
the experience of sadness. Misinterpretation of facial expressions of emotion can 
therefore lead to unsuccessful social interactions.   
Correctly identifying the affective state of those who we interact with has 
important implications for who we can trust for a successful interaction. Therefore, 
reliable visual information specifying the differences between genuine and posed 
expressions is important for perceivers to be able to interact with others successfully. 
However, this information needs to be readily perceivable to provide an advantage in 
social situations. 
 
1.6 Posed and Genuine Expressions of Happiness – The Smile 
Firstly it is important to consider posed and genuine expressions of 
happiness, as the distinction between these expressions has received the most 
attention in the research in this area. The most commonly studied facial expression of 
emotion is the smile, which is associated with happiness. French anatomist Duchenne 
de Boulogne was the first to characterise the genuine smile as containing the 
contraction of two major muscle areas (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). The 
first muscle involved in smiles is zygomaticus major extending from the top of the 
cheekbone to the upper lip, which when contracted pulls the corner of the mouth 
outward and upward. The contraction of zygomaticus major is a movement most 
people are able to complete voluntarily (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). The 
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second muscle involved in genuine smiles is orbicularis oculi, which when 
contracted pulls the skin towards the eye ball causing wrinkles or „crow‟s feet‟ 
around the corners of the eyes, this is also referred to as the „Duchenne 
Marker‟(Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). While most people are able to 
voluntarily contract the medial portion of orbicularis oculi, the ability to contract the 
lateral portion voluntarily is not a common ability (Ekman, Roper, Hager 1980). It is 
only the lateral parts of the muscle that are involved in the expression of genuine 
happiness, as was noted by Duchenne and confirmed by Ekman, Friesen and 
O‟Sullivan (1988). It is the combination of orbicularis oculi and zygomaticus major 
contraction that gives the impression of genuine happiness, contraction of 
zygomaticus major alone does not (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). For 
examples of a posed and genuine smile see Figure 1.  
The contraction of the medial portion of orbicularis oculi involved in genuine 
smiles is often regarded as a marker of felt emotion; however, there is some 
argument in the literature concerning the reliability of this marker.  Orbicularis oculi 
contraction has been found to occur in both genuine and posed smiles, or be absent in 
genuine expressions (see Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009; Schmidt, Ambadar, Cohn, 
& Reed, 2006; Soussignan, 2002). The contraction of orbicularis oculi has also been 
found to occur in negative emotions such as distress, pain and sadness (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1982). Contraction of orbicularis oculi may be perceived differently when 
present in expressions of different emotions. The perception of both positive and 
negative emotions is affected by the presence of orbicularis oculi contraction 
(Bolzani Dinehart, Messinger, Acosta, Cassel, Ambadar & Cohn, 2005; Messinger, 
2002). Specifically when orbicularis oculi contraction was associated with infants‟ 
smiles, positive expressions were rated as more positive; when it was associated with 
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crying faces these expressions were rated as more negative. However, despite some 
inconsistency in the literature, the „Duchenne Marker‟ is still maintained as being a 
reliable marker of the experience of happiness. 
Posed and genuine smiles are thought to differ on several features.  Ekman & 
Friesen (1982) postulate five potential markers that differentiate between posed and 
genuine smiles:  1) The Duchenne marker, characteristic of genuine but not of posed 
smiles, 2) The symmetry of zygomaticus major contraction; genuine smiles possesses 
more symmetry in the contraction of this muscle than posed smiles (supported by 
Ekman et al., 1981; Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1999), 3) The smoothness of muscle 
contraction; genuine smiles are smoother in their contraction of the muscle groups 
involved than posed smiles, 4) The duration of the expression; genuine smiles have a 
more standard duration when compared to posed smiles which are more erratic in 
their duration (supported by Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; Hess & Kleck, 1990), 
5) The degree of synchrony of action; the movements contained in genuine smiles 
are more in sync than those present in posed smiles.  
This indicates that there are several reliable markers available for use by 
perceivers to differentiate between posed and genuine happiness. 
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1.7 Posed and Genuine Expressions of Sadness 
With regard to other basic emotions, there is not as much evidence of 
physiognomic differences between posed and genuine expressions. However, 
sadness is one emotion that has been investigated and defined in terms of what 
characterises genuine and posed expressions (McLellan, Johnston, Dalrymple-Alford 
& Porter, 2010). The contraction of frontalis pars medialis and corrugator/depressor 
supecillii (which raise and lower the inner brow respectively) result in the 
straightening of the inner portion of eyebrow or an oblique angle and a triangulation 
of the inner upper eye lid. These patterns of muscle movement are often found in 
prototypical expressions of sadness (e.g. Ekman, 2003; Gosselin, Kirouac & Dore, 
1995; Kohler et al., 2004) and have been suggested as the core movements 
specifying sadness (McLellan et al, 2010). The movements described above are more 
probable in genuine than posed expressions of sadness (Gosselin et al., 1995).  
                                    A             B 
 
Figure 1. A Genuine (A) and Posed (B) Smile         
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All expressions of sadness typically contain contraction of at least two of the 
following muscles - frontalis pars medialis (raises the inner brow), corrugator 
superciii (lowers the brow), depressor anguli oris (lowers the corner of the lips), 
mentalis (raises the chin) (Gosselin & Kirouac, 1995; Kohler et al., 2004). However, 
it is the simultaneous contraction of the frontalis and corrugator/depressor supecillii 
that is only present in genuine expressions of sadness (McLellan et al., 2010). Posed 
expressions of sadness have also been found to be more exaggerated than genuine 
expressions (Naab & Russell, 2007; Tcherkassof, et al. 2007), containing additional 
as well as more intense muscle movements. For examples of a posed and genuine 
expression of sadness see Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 A          B 
 
Figure 2. A Genuine (A) and Posed (B) Expression of sadness         
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1.8 Perceiver Sensitivity to the Differences Distinguishing Posed and Genuine 
Emotions  
Facial expressions as a source of information are only valuable if the 
information presented can be reliably detected by perceivers. While research has 
shown that perceivers are sensitive to emotional information present in prototypical 
displays of emotions, how sensitive are perceivers to the information specifying 
posed versus genuine emotions? Healthy adults have been shown to be sensitive to 
the differences between posed and genuine smiles (Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993; 
McLellan et al., 2010; Miles & Johnston, 2007).  Participants in such studies have 
shown the ability to judge the emotional state of happiness from photographs of 
smiles, both when asked if targets were displaying happiness and when asked if the 
targets were actually feeling happy. Perceivers show more sensitivity to the 
emotional experience of happiness from smiles when asked if targets were 
experiencing happiness than when asked if targets were only showing happiness 
(McLellan et al., 2010; Miles & Johnston, 2007). This demonstrated that when 
explicitly asked to attend to affective state, participants are sensitive to information 
specifying felt emotion. The ability to differentiate between posed and genuine 
expressions has been shown to be similar for both photographs and video displays of 
expressions (Miles & Johnston, 2007). While dynamic displays of expressions 
potentially provide more information specifying whether a smile is genuine or posed, 
these displays have not shown significantly improved sensitivity over static displays. 
Healthy adults have also been shown to be sensitive to differences between genuine 
and posed expressions of sadness, using similar methods as for happiness (McLellan 
et al., 2010). Although the levels of sensitivity for expression of sadness were lower 
than for those found for expressions of happiness. Other studies have also shown that 
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perceivers are less sensitive to sadness specified in facial expressions compared to 
happiness (Calder et al, 2003; Gosselin et al., 1995). 
Previous research has often involved perceivers making explicit judgements 
about the nature of facial expressions; these explicit judgements while providing 
information regarding perceiver sensitivity may not reflect behaviour in real world 
social interactions. Previous research has shown that the exposure to facial 
expressions, without explicit labelling can have an effect on perceiver behaviour. 
Genuine smiles have shown a priming affect for positive words versus negative 
words (McLellan et al., 2010; Miles & Johnston, 2007). Genuine smiles have also 
shown an effect on product preference in perceivers. When evaluating emotionally 
neutral products worn by a model (t-shirts identical in style but displayed in different 
colours), perceivers showed a preference for t-shirts paired with the model displaying 
a genuine smile over posed smile or a neutral expression (Peace, Miles & Johnston, 
2006). These findings indicate that even when not asked to explicitly attend to facial 
expressions of emotion, these expressions showed an effect on perceiver behaviour.     
Whether the facial expressions of others are perceived as posed or genuine 
has been shown to have an effect on the behaviour of the perceiver as discussed 
above. Indicating that ability to perceive the differences between posed and genuine 
emotions has consequences for social behaviour, and consequently impact the 
success of social interactions.   The focus of more recent research involving posed 
and genuine expressions has been on populations that have shown deficits in the 
processing of facial expressions and that also experience social difficulties. 
Populations of concern have included those with Autistic Spectrum Disorder 
(Blampied, Johnston, Miles, & Liberty, 2010; Boraston, Corden, Miles, Skuse & 
Blakemore, 2008) and Alzheimer‟s disease (McLellan et al., 2010). These two 
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groups have been shown to have impaired abilities in differentiating posed and 
genuine expressions when compared to controls. The ability of those with depressive 
symptoms to differentiate between posed and genuine expressions warrants 
consideration, as other populations with social difficulties have been found to have 
impairments in this area.  
 
1.9 Summary of the Current Research 
 Previous research has shown that individuals with depressive symptoms show 
difficulty recognising lower intensity positive emotions in facial expressions 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2006; Surguladze et al., 2004) and are more biased towards 
identifying negative emotions (Gur et al., 1992; Hale, 1998). Rumination associated 
with depressive symptoms has also been shown to have an effect on the perception of 
negative emotions (Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006).  However, there has been 
little research focused on the sensitivity of individuals with depressive symptoms 
who engage in rumination to the cues specifying genuine and posed expressions of 
emotion, which the current research aimed to address. Rumination has been theorised 
to be driving the biases of attention which lead to emotion recognition in 
impairments in those diagnosed with depression (Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006). 
Previous research has also found that the effects of rumination on sensitivity to 
affective state are related to depressive symptoms (Johnston, Carter & McLellan, in 
press). This suggests a need for the relationship between symptoms of depression and 
level of rumination to be investigated further in relation to emotion sensitivity 
especially considering that depression and rumination scores have been shown to be 
highly correlated. Relationships found with either depressive symptoms or level of 
rumination and emotion sensitivity need to take into consideration how these 
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variables may be showing combined effects and this will be considered in the current 
research. 
The current research had a focus on happy, sad and neutral facial expressions, as 
previous research has shown that individuals with depressive symptoms have 
specific difficulties concerning these particular expressions (e.g. Gur et. al, 1992). 
These expressions of emotion also have the most reliable markers distinguishing 
posed and genuine expressions when compared with other basic emotions.   
Building and extending on the previous research concerning emotion recognition 
and its relation to depression and rumination, the current research investigated the 
sensitivity of those with a range of depressive symptoms (as measured by the 
Depression subscale of the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales - DASS; Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995) and level of rumination (as measured by the Rumination subscale 
of Response Styles Questionnaire - RSQ-R; Nolen- Hoeksema, 1991) to the 
distinctions between posed and genuine facial expressions of emotion. 
The current research also investigated the mechanisms underlying impairments in 
emotion recognition suggested in the literature, and how they are linked with 
depressive symptoms and rumination. One mechanism suggested being an attentional 
bias towards negative expressions (e.g. Gotlib et al., 2004). The current research 
investigated the relationship between attention and ability to differentiate between 
posed and genuine expressions by employing a recognition task  
(measuring recognition of displays from the experimental task) as a proxy measure 
for attention. In addition, related to the previous findings of processing effects on 
judgements of non-verbal social behaviour (Ambady & Gray 2002; Tracey and 
Robins, 2008), the current research investigated the effect of distraction (cognitive 
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load) on perceiver sensitivity, and how it related to depressive symptoms and 
rumination.  
To investigate emotion sensitivity participants completed an emotion 
categorisation task modified from Johnston, Carter & McLellan (in press). The task 
involved participants first viewing blocks of photographs and indicating whether 
targets were showing the specified emotion (happiness or sadness). Secondly 
participants were asked to indicate whether targets were feeling the specified 
emotion. This allowed differences in perceiver sensitivity when asked to explicitly 
attend to affective state to be seen. In order to examine the effect of distraction on 
information processing and its relationship with perceiver sensitivity, participants 
completed the emotion categorisation task while under a cognitive load 
(remembering a seven digit number) and without a cognitive load. 
To investigate whether an attentional bias was present and how this was related 
to perceiver sensitivity, participants completed a recognition exercise at the 
completion of the emotion categorisation task as a proxy measure for attention paid 
to targets in the task. Participants were shown a series of photographs, half of which 
were present in the emotion categorisation task and half of which were entirely new 
photographs. Participants were asked to identify which of the targets had been 
present in the emotion categorisation task.   
Previous research investigating emotion recognition in both those experiencing 
depression and engaging in rumination allowed for predictions to be made about how 
participants will perform in the current research. Based on previous findings in the 
literature outlined in the introduction the following predictions were made in the 
current research: 
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Due to the strong relationship present between depression and rumination it 
would be expected that these two variables would show interaction effects with 
regards to the predictions outlined below. It was predicted that both level of 
depressive symptoms and levels of rumination would show negative correlations 
with emotion sensitivity in conditions without a cognitive load component. It was 
expected that the higher the level of depressive symptoms and level of rumination, 
the lower the sensitivity to the differences between posed and genuine expressions of 
emotion.  
Given the theory that deliberative processing has a detrimental effect on 
judgements concerning non-verbal behaviour (Ambady & Gray), it was predicted 
that when completing the task under cognitive load higher levels of depressive 
symptoms and level of rumination would be associated with increased sensitivity 
compared to conditions without a cognitive load. This relationship was predicted 
because experiencing a cognitive load was expected to distract from deliberative 
processing of the facial displays. 
Considering bias, it was predicted that both level of depressive symptoms and 
level of rumination would show positive correlations with bias to expressions of 
sadness. It was expected that higher levels of depressive symptoms and rumination 
would be associated with higher levels of bias to sad expressions.    
With regard to the recognition task, it was predicted that both level of depressive 
symptoms and level of rumination would show negative correlations with 
recognition of expressions of happiness and positive correlations with recognition of 
expressions of sadness. It was expected that higher levels of depressive symptoms 
and rumination would be associated with lower recognition of expressions of 
happiness; higher levels of depressive symptoms and/or rumination would be 
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associated with greater recognition of sad expressions. Attention paid to those 
expressions in the emotion categorisation task was to be inferred from these 
relationships. 
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2. METHOD 
 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 101 Canterbury University students and members of the 
wider Christchurch community who voluntarily participated in the study. Participants 
were recruited through the use of posters advertising the study (see Appendix A), 
which were placed on notice boards throughout the University, local supermarkets 
and public libraries. Participants were also recruited though the University‟s 
Psychology Department Undergraduate Participant Pool website. The Participant 
Pool consists of students enrolled in Psychology Undergraduate papers PSYC 105 
and 106; a requirement of these papers is that students participate in a research study 
of their choice and complete an accompanying question and answer sheet addressing 
the research principles of the study in order to gain 1-2% course credit.  
Inclusion criteria were applied. To be included in the study each participant 
had to report having normal or corrected-to normal vision (the data from one 
participant who was legally blind was omitted from the reported analyses) and 
speaking English fluently at home or at work. Participants also had to report having 
no previous history of brain injury or any significant past or current psychiatric 
condition requiring the intervention of a health professional (other than symptoms of 
depression and anxiety).  
The final sample included in the data analysis was 100 participants (female 
=66), ranging in age from 17 – 71 (M = 22.8, SD = 8.8), and having on average 14.9 
years of education (SD = 2.1). The reported ethnicities of participants was as follows: 
62 NZ European, 12 Other European, 8 Asian , 6 NZ European/Maori,  2  NZ 
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European/Asian, 2 American, 2 African , 2 Australian, 1 Maori, 1 Samoan, 1 
Canadian  and 1 Scottish/Malaysian. 
After completing the study participants received a $10 voucher to thank them 
for their time. Those who were recruited through the Psychology Department 
Undergraduate participant pool (n = 60) received course credit (between 1-2%) 
instead of a voucher, on completion of the question and answer sheet.  
 
2.2 Materials and Measures        
2.2.1 Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS) were used to measure 
each participant‟s level of depression and anxiety. The DASS is a relatively quick 
paper and pen questionnaire that was completed in about 5 minutes by most 
participants. The DASS is based on a dimensional rather than a categorical 
conceptualisation of psychological disorder and as such does not allocate those who 
complete the measure to discrete diagnostic categories. The DASS does however 
have suggested categorical distinctions with suggested cut off scores for normal, 
mild, moderate, severe and extremely severe categories for each subscale. The DASS 
contains 42 items and each participant responded to the extent that each item applied 
to them over the preceding week (0- “Did not apply to me at all”; 1- “Applied to me 
to some degree, or some of the time”; 2- “Applied to me a considerable degree, or a 
good part of the time”; 3 – “Applied to me very much, or most of the time”). The 
measure is broken down in three sub-scales (Depression, Anxiety, and Stress) each 
containing 14 items, and having a possible range of 0-42.  Higher scores in a 
particular sub-scale indicate higher levels of that factor, for example higher scores in 
the Depression scale indicate increased depression severity. Depression scores were 
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the main focus for analyses and Anxiety scores were analysed in order assess the 
level of these symptoms in participants, and be aware any effects of anxiety. Given 
the focus of the present research the Stress sub-scale score was not included in any of 
the analyses.  
The DASS has been shown to have good test re-test reliability with alpha 
values of 0.91, 0.81, and 0.89 for the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress scales 
respectively (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS factor structure has been 
supported by both exploratory and confirmatory factory analysis (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995). The DASS Anxiety scale and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) 
show a high correlation (0.81) and the DASS Depression scale and the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) are also highly correlated (0.74) (Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995). Lovibond and Lovibond (1995) suggest the lower correlation between the 
BDI and the DASS Depression scale may result from the BDI containing more items 
related to the somatic complaints of depression.  
 
2.2.2 Ruminative subscale of Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ-R; Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1991) 
 The modified version of the Ruminative subscale of the Reponses Styles 
Questionnaire (RSQ-R) was used in this study to measure the level of each 
participant‟s rumination (Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). The RSQ-R 
contains 25 items and is a brief paper and pen questionnaire that can be completed in 
about 5 minutes by most participants. The RSQ-R is self-report scale assessing the 
extent of rumination in situations of low mood or depression. For each item (e.g. I 
analyse recent events to try and understand why I am depressed) each participant is 
asked to indicate whether they never, sometimes, often or always think or do this 
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when they feel depressed. Responses are converted to a 4-point scale and scores are 
summed to give a range from 25-100.  Higher scores are an indication of greater 
rumination. The RSQ-R has been shown to have both high reliability and validity in 
both clinical and non clinical samples (Bagby et al., 2004, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Bagby et al., (2004) reviewed the stability of the RSQ-R across studies and found r 
values ranging from 0.36 – 0.80.  
 
2.2.3 Facial Displays 
 Facial displays were used in the Emotion Categorisation Task and the 
Recognition Task. The facial displays used were generated in previous research 
studies in the Social Perception Laboratories in the Psychology Department of the 
University of Canterbury, and a summary of the generation process follows. Full 
details can be found in McLellan (2008). 
 In the generation phase participants were seated approximately 60cm in front 
of a computer monitor where stimulus material was presented in a PowerPoint 
slideshow. Each participant was recorded using a digital video camera mounted 
above the monitor. The slide show included pictures from the International Affective 
Pictures System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001) and sound clips from the 
International Affective Digitized Sounds database (IADS; Bradley & Lang, 1999), 
which were used to elicit affective responses. To generate neutral expressions, 
participants were asked to look into the camera and relax. To generate posed 
expressions, participants were asked to smile as if they would for an ID photo, or 
recreate how they thought they might have looked earlier when they experienced 
sadness.  
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The expressions used in the present study were coded using the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS) (Ekman, Friesen & Hager, 2002). The FACS is widely used 
to describe and measure facial behaviour, and is based on how the contraction of 
different facial muscles affects the appearance of the face. Action Units (AUs) are 
used to describe movement in the face, and combinations of AUs are used to describe 
expressions of prototypical facial expressions of emotion. The genuine expressions 
of happiness used in the present study involved both activation of zygomaticus major 
(AU12; raises the corner of the lip) and obicularis oculi (AU6; creates wrinkles in 
the outer corner of the eye), while posed expressions only involved activation of 
zygomaticus major (AU12).  Both types of expression included the contraction of 
depressor labii inferioris (AU25) or masseter (AU26), to ensure the display of teeth. 
Both types of sad expressions included contraction of at least two of the following 
AUs found to most commonly occur in sad expressions (as identified in Gosselin & 
Kirouac, 1995; Kohler et al., 2004;) – frontalis pars medialis (AU1; inner brown 
raiser), corrugator superciii (AU4; brow lowerer), depressor anguli oris (AU15; lip 
corner depressor), mentalis (AU17; chin raiser). Genuine but not posed expressions 
of sadness contained simultaneous contraction of AU1 and AU4. All of the posed 
and genuine expressions were matched for intensity level (+ 1 level), according to 
FACS criteria. During the generation procedure each participant was asked to rate 
their reaction to each stimulus display, by a forced choice option (happy, sad, fear, 
surprise, angry, disgust, and neutral). They also recorded the strength of their 
reactions using a low/moderate/high visual scale.  Each of the genuine expressions 
used in this study was elicited by an appropriate stimulus during a self-reported 
moderate to high experience of the relevant emotion and was FACS coded as 
corresponding to prototypical movements associated with each emotion. Each of the 
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posed expressions also corresponded to prototypical movements associated with each 
emotion but in contrast were not elicited during the self-reported experience of any 
emotion. The neutral expressions were generated when the participants reported a 
neutral state and there was no discernible movement of facial muscles. The present 
study used black and white facial displays that were cropped to present head and 
shoulders only and were standardised for size.  
 
2.2.4 Emotion Categorisation Task 
 The Emotion Categorisation task is a modified version to that used in 
Johnston, Carter and McLellan (in press).  There were eight blocks of trials in total in 
the Emotion Categorisation Task, with each block comprising of 21 facial displays (7 
sets of posed, genuine and neutral expressions). Participants were asked to judge two 
emotions: happiness and sadness, and there were two conditions within each 
emotion: show and feel. The same blocks were also completed under cognitive load.  
The facial displays were first presented in the show conditions, then the feel 
conditions with the order of emotion counterbalanced and order of the displays 
within the blocks randomised for each participant. Participants completed four blocks 
of trials for each target emotion; one trial judging the emotion shown and one 
judging the emotion felt, and then making these same judgements while under 
cognitive load. Participants made their judgements by pressing the A (for YES the 
person is Feeling/Showing the target emotion) and L (for NO the person is Not 
Feeling/Showing the target emotion) keys on a laptop keyboard.  
The cognitive load manipulation was a modification to the task, and the order 
that participants completed the cognitive load condition was counterbalanced. To 
manipulate cognitive load a seven digit number appeared on screen before each 
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block of trials (each of the four blocks was assigned its own number) and the 
participant was asked to repeat it out loud twice in order to assist with recall at the 
end of the block and to ensure they read the number correctly (similar task used in 
Tracy and Robins, 2008). That each participant experienced cognitive load was 
verified by the attempt to recall the seven digit number at the end of each block of 
trials. Correct recall of the number was not required, as it has been shown that results 
in cognitive load conditions do not differ across participants who correctly recall 
numbers and those who do not (Tracy & Robins, 2008).   
All instructions for the Emotion Categorisation task were provided on an 
instruction sheet (see Appendix B) that participants read before completing the task, 
and instructions were also explained verbally and provided on the computer screen. It 
was explained that the expression and experience of emotion are not always the 
same, and while sometimes an individual can experience an emotion while not 
expressing it, the opposite is also true. Participants were also informed of the 
cognitive load condition and told that in some trials they would be asked to 
remember a number during the task and recall it at the end of the trial.   
 
2.2.5 Recognition Task 
The recognition task was a proxy measure for attention paid to faces in the 
emotion categorisation task; as such participants were not given any indication that a 
memory task would be included. Participants were presented with a set of facial 
displays, half being faces from the emotion categorisation task and half being new 
facial displays (48 displays in total). The new facial displays included the same 
number of genuine, posed and neutral expressions. Instructions were given to 
participants that they were going to see a series of photos and it was their task to 
39 
 
determine which of these were present in the previous tasks (familiar photos) and 
which were not (unfamiliar photos).  Participants made their judgements by pressing 
the A (for YES the person is FAMILIAR) or L (for NO the person is NOT 
FAMILIAR) keys on a laptop keyboard. Instructions for the Recognition task were 
presented on screen before the task began and were also explained verbally. 
 
2.3 Procedure 
 Each participant was tested individually by a female experimenter. Once each 
participant arrived in the Social Perception Lab s/he was given an Information Sheet 
to read (see Appendix C), which was then further explained verbally by the 
experimenter. Each participant was informed that the research was looking at the 
relationship between responses on questionnaires asking about feelings about self, 
response to life events and performance on a computer-based task assessing ability to 
make judgements about emotions in others. After being given the opportunity to ask 
any questions each participant signed the Consent Form (see Appendix D). 
 Each participant then completed the Participant Questionnaire Booklet, which 
contained demographic questions as well as the DASS and the RSQ-R (see Appendix 
E). The order in which participants completed the DASS and the RSQ-R was 
counterbalanced. Once the questionnaires were completed each participant was given 
an instruction sheet for the Emotion Categorisation task and these instructions were 
clarified verbally.  
Each participant was seated comfortably in front of a 14inch laptop and 
instructed to begin the computer tasks. Instructions appeared on screen before each 
stage of the task and each block began with a practise trial. Each participant 
completed four blocks of trials with/without the cognitive load (depending on the 
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counterbalanced order), and then was given the instructions to complete the next four 
blocks of trials with/without the cognitive load. After each participant completed the 
Emotion Categorisation task s/he was given instructions for the Recognition task that 
s/he then completed.   
During the tasks, the experimenter remained in the room to answer any 
questions and to ensure that each participant carried out the cognitive load condition 
(read the number aloud twice and recalled the number after each block). The 
experimenter also reminded each participant of changes to the target emotion and/or 
judgement condition. After completing the task each participant was debriefed (see 
Appendix F) and thanked for their participation. The whole procedure was completed 
in 30 - 40 minutes. 
The study was reviewed and approved by the Upper South B Regional Ethics 
Committee; ethics reference number URB/10/04/016. 
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3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
The demographic details of the 100 participants included in final analyses are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
 Mean SD Range 
Age  22.8 8.8 17 – 71 
Reported Education (Years) 14.9  2.1 10-23 
Sex (% female) 66% - - 
DASS-Depression subscale 6.6 8.5 0 – 42 
Rumination 52.8 13.8 25 - 86  
 
 
3.2 Questionnaires 
Both the DASS and the RSQ-R questionnaires possessed high reliability with alpha 
values of .95 and .94 respectively. Shapiro-Wilkes W tests revealed a normal 
distribution of RSQ-R scores (W=.974, p =.46) but a negative skew for the 
Depression subscale of the DASS (W = .736, p < .001).The percentages of 
participants scoring in each category of the DASS-D were as follows: Normal – 
79%, Mild – 6%, Moderate – 7%, Severe – 4%, Extremely Severe - 4%. The DASS-
D subscale and RSQ-R showed a significant positive correlation (r (100) = 0.65, p 
<.05).  
 
3.3 Recall in Cognitive Load Trials 
Participant data was included in analyses if they attempted to recall the seven digits 
number.  Correct recall was defined as recalling all seven digits of the number (in 
any order) presented before each of the four cognitive load trials. The percentage of 
participants that had correct recall in all four trials was 52%, 30% had correct recall 
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in three trials, 12% recalled the number in only two trials, 5% correctly recalled the 
number once, and 1% did not recall the number correctly in any trials. There were no 
significant correlations between number of errors in recall and DASS-D or RSQ-R 
scores. 
 
3.4 Emotion categorisation 
The percentage YES responses for each participant were calculated for each emotion 
(Happy/Sad), condition (Show/Feel), and expression type (Genuine/Posed/Neutral). 
The percentages were calculated separately for the no cognitive load condition (see 
Table 2), and the cognitive load condition (see Table 3). If participants differentiated 
between posed and genuine expressions, findings would show genuine expressions 
identified as both showing and feeling the target emotion, but posed expressions 
identified as only showing the target emotions. Neutral expressions would be 
expected to be identified as neither showing nor feeling the target emotions. Visual 
inspection of the data suggests this is the case for each emotion, as the percentage of 
YES responses for posed expressions is less in the feel condition than in the show 
condition for each emotion, but there appears little difference in the percentage of 
YES responses to genuine expressions in the show and feel conditions. If cognitive 
load is showing an effect on participant categorisation we would expect to see 
significant differences between the load and no load conditions. There appears to be 
little difference between the patterns of percentage YES responses across cognitive 
load conditions. There were also a relatively high number of YES responses to 
neutral expressions in the sad conditions compared to the happy conditions.  
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In order to confirm these initial observations, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted on the data. As sensitivity was the main focus of the current research these 
analyses can be found in Appendix G.  
    
Table 2. Percentage of YES Responses in the No Cognitive Load Condition by 
Judgement Condition and Expression Type for each Emotion 
 Judgement condition 
Facial Expression Show (%Yes) Feel (%Yes) 
Happy    
 Genuine 95 94 
 Posed 91 51 
 Neutral 7 9 
Sad    
 Genuine 84 76 
 Posed 72 43 
 Neutral 31 35 
 
 
 
Table 3. Percentage of YES Responses in the Cognitive Load Condition by 
Judgement Condition and Expression Type for each Emotion 
 Judgement condition 
Facial Expression Show (%Yes) Feel (%Yes) 
Happy    
 Genuine 96 93 
 Posed 82 57 
 Neutral 7 9 
Sad    
 Genuine 84 74 
 Posed 69 40 
 Neutral 32 35 
 
3.5 Sensitivity 
Responses in the emotion categorization task were also analysed using a non-
parametric signal detection analysis. Signal detection analysis is used to determine 
perceiver sensitivity to information that specifies the target stimuli among 
information that does not. Sensitivity is calculated by determining hits (when a target 
is correctly identified) and false alarms (when non target stimuli are incorrectly 
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identified as being target stimuli). Two analyses were conducted using sensitivity 
scores, the first included all expression types to look at sensitivity to emotion 
specified in facial expressions; being the ability of perceivers to distinguish 
information in facial expressions that specifies affective state from information that 
does not. Specifically, the first analysis looked at whether participants correctly 
identified that genuine expressions specified a congruent underlying emotional state, 
whereas neutral and posed expressions did not. In the second analysis neutral 
expressions were removed to examine sensitivity to the differences between posed 
and genuine expressions. Sensitivity in the second analysis referred to the ability to 
detect information that specifies affective state from information that is 
representative of affect state but does not specify it. Specifically, the second analysis 
looked at whether participants identified genuine but not posed expressions as 
specifying a congruent underlying emotional state. 
 
 Participant data was collated into hits and false alarms separately for each emotion, 
judgment condition, expression type and load condition. A hit was defined as 
responding YES to a genuine expression in both analyses, while a false alarm in the 
first analysis was defined as responding YES to either a neutral or a posed expression 
and in the second analysis a false alarm was defined as responding YES to a posed 
expression. 
 
The correction recommended by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) was applied to hits 
and false alarm rates, in order to convert to the associated rates of hits and false 
alarms. The corrected rates were used to calculate measures of sensitivity (A’) for 
each participant as a function of emotion, judgment condition and load condition. 
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The formulas used for the calculation of sensitivity can be found in Appendix H. 
Higher scores of A’ are indicative of higher sensitivity, the estimates of A’ are shown 
in Table 3 
 
Table 3. Mean Estimates of A‟ by Emotion and Load condition for each Condition. 
Note. Analysis 1 included posed, genuine and neutral expressions. 
Note. Analysis 2 included only posed and genuine expressions. 
 
As discussed, in the first analysis, sensitivity refers to the ability to detect 
information specifying affective state. Higher sensitivity scores indicate greater 
discrimination of genuine expressions that specify experienced emotion from 
expressions that do not (posed and neutral expressions). Sensitivity scores ranged 
from .73 to .87. Single-sample t-tests (p < .05) showed that the sensitivity scores 
were significantly greater than chance (0.5), in each experimental condition, 
indicating that participants were indeed sensitive to information specifying the 
differences between experienced and not experienced emotion. 
 
In the second analysis, sensitivity refers to the ability to differentiate between posed 
and genuine expressions. Sensitivity scores in this analysis ranged from .55 – .76. 
Single-sample t-tests (p < .05) showed that the sensitivity scores were significantly 
greater than chance (0.5), indicating that participants were sensitive to the differences 
between posed and genuine expressions of happiness and sadness. 
 
Analysis 1 Analysis 2 
Facial Expression Judgement condition Judgement condition 
Happy 
 
Show 
A‟ (SD) 
Feel 
A‟ (SD) 
Show 
A‟ (SD) 
Feel 
A‟ (SD) 
 
No Load 0.81 (.12) 0.87(.07) 0.55 (.15) 0.76 (.15) 
 
Load 0.83 (.08) 0.87 (.22) 0.60 (.16) 0.75 (.21) 
Sad 
   
  
 
No Load 0.73 (.13) 0.73 (.17) 0.59 (.16) 0.70 (.18) 
 
Load 0.73 (.12) 0.75 (.14) 0.60 (.18) 0.72 (.17) 
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ANOVA was used to confirm these observations. Preliminary analysis showed that 
there was no effect of sex on sensitivity and this factor was not considered further. 
Separate 2 (Cognitive load: load/no load) x2 (Emotion: happy/sad) x 2 (Judgement 
condition: show/feel) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each 
sensitivity analysis. Analysis 1 revealed main effects of Emotion F (1, 99) = 77.51, 
p < .001, 2p =.439 and Condition F (1, 99) = 4.79, p < .05, 
2
p = .046 these were 
qualified by a significant 3 way interaction F (1, 99) = 5.26, p < .001, 2p = .050.   
 
In light of the revealed 3 way interactions separate 2 (Cognitive Load: no load/load) 
x 2 (Condition: show/feel) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each 
emotion. For happiness, the analysis displayed a main effect of Condition F (1, 99) = 
4.68, p < .05, 2p = .045 qualified by a significant interaction F (1, 99) = 4.84, p < 
.05, 2p = .047 which is shown in Figure 3. Post-hoc tests (Tukey, p < .05) on the 
interaction showed that for expressions of happiness in the no load condition 
participants showed higher levels of sensitivity in the feel condition than in the show 
condition (M = .87 vs. M = .81). Participants did not show this difference in 
sensitivity across conditions when under the effect of cognitive load (M = .83 vs. M 
= .83). There was no significant difference between sensitivity in the show condition 
in no load and load conditions (M = .81 vs. M = .83). When completing the task 
without cognitive load participants were more sensitive to information specifying 
happiness when asked what targets were feeling than when asked what targets were 
showing. However participants did not show this difference in sensitivity when under 
a cognitive load. For sadness, the analysis displayed no significant main effects or 
interactions. 
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Analysis 2 revealed a main effect of Condition F (1, 99) = 93.65, p < .001, 2p =.486 
qualified by significant Load by Condition F (1, 99) = 5.44, p < .05, 2p = .052 and 
Emotion by Condition F (1, 99) = 7.01, p < .01, 2p = .066 interactions and a 3 way 
interaction F (1, 99) = 6.16, p < .05, 2p = .059.  
 
In light of the revealed 3 way interactions separate 2 (Cognitive Load: no load/load) 
x 2 (Condition: show/feel) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each 
emotion. For happiness, analysis displayed a main effect of Condition F (1, 99) = 
84.69, p < .001, 2p = .461 qualified by a significant interaction F (1, 99) = 11.25, p 
< .01, 2p = .102, which is shown in Figure 4. Post-hoc tests (Tukey, p < .05) on the 
interaction showed that for expressions of happiness in both the no load and load 
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Figure 3. Sensitivity to Happiness in Analysis 1 as a Function of Condition and Load 
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conditions participants showed higher levels of sensitivity to the difference between 
genuine and posed expressions when asked what targets were feeling (M = .76 & .72)  
than when asked what targets were showing (M = .55 & .60 ). In addition, 
participants showed higher levels of sensitivity in the show condition when under 
cognitive load compared to no load , however, there was not a significant difference 
in sensitivity between load conditions in the feel condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For sadness, the analysis displayed a main effect of Condition F (1, 99) = 48.90, p < 
.001, 2p = .331, but no interaction. Post-hoc tests (Tukey, p < .05) showed that for 
expressions of sadness sensitivity to the differences between posed and genuine 
emotions were significantly higher in the feel (M = .71 ) than the show condition (M 
= .59 ). Therefore there was no effect of cognitive load found when making 
judgements about expressions of sadness 
Show Feel
Condition
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
 No Load
 Load
Figure 4. Sensitivity to Happiness in Analysis 2 as a Function of Condition and Load 
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3.6 Bias 
 
Response bias was also analysed using a non-parametric signal detection analysis as 
discussed above and the formulas used for the calculation of response bias can be 
found in Appendix H. Bias is a measure of the tendency of participants to respond to 
one response over another, YES or NO in the case of the emotion categorisation task.  
A negative response bias score indicated the tendency of participants to categorise 
expressions as showing or feeling the target emotion (answering YES to the question 
in each judgement condition), over the target not showing or feeling the target 
emotion. Bias scores were compared to 0 (representing no bias), using single sample 
t-tests. Bias was shown to be significantly greater than 0 (single sample t test, p < 
.05), except for judgements of sadness in the feel condition in both load conditions in 
analysis 2. This suggests that participants did not demonstrate a response bias when 
making judgements differentiating posed and genuine expressions of sadness when 
asked what targets were feeling but did demonstrate a tendency to respond YES 
when considering whether targets were showing sadness and when making either 
judgement with regard to happiness. Bias scores are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Mean Estimates of B‟ by Emotion and Load condition for each Condition. 
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions. 
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions. 
 
 Analysis 1 Analysis 2 
Facial Expression Judgement condition Judgement condition 
Happy  
Show 
B” (SD) 
Feel  
B” (SD) 
Show  
B” (SD) 
Feel  
B” (SD) 
 No Load -0.55 (.22) -0.31 (.35) -0.12 (.22) -0.27 (.29) 
 Load -0.49 (.24) -0.35 (.35) -0.16 (.27) -0.28 (.29) 
Sad      
 No Load -0.25 (.28) -0.13 (.35) -0.09 (.26) -0.07 (.35) 
 Load -0.26 (.29) -0.09 (.34) -0.17 (.24) -0.04 (.33) 
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Separate 2 (Emotion: happy/sad) x 2 (Judgment condition: show/feel) x 2 (Cognitive 
Load: no load/load) repeated measures ANOVAs were completed for each analysis. 
Analysis 1 revealed a main effect Emotion F (1, 99) = 97.06, p < .001, 2p =.495 and 
Condition F (1, 99) = 5.12, p < .001, 2p =.280. There were no significant 
interactions. This demonstrated that participants showed higher levels of bias when 
making judgements about happy expressions compared to making judgements about 
sad expressions. Participants also showed higher levels of bias when making 
judgements about what targets were showing compared to making judgements about 
what participants were feeling. 
 
Analysis 2 revealed a main effect Emotion F (1, 99) = 19.92, p < .001, 2p =.167 
which was qualified by a significant Emotion by Condition F (1, 99) = 3.17, p < 
.001, 2p =.249 interaction shown in Figure 5. Post-hoc tests (Tukey, p < .05) showed 
that levels of response bias were significantly higher for happy expressions than sad 
expressions in the feel condition (M= -.29 vs. -.06) but did not differ between 
emotion in the show condition (M= -.14 vs. -.16). When asked to judge what targets 
were feeling, participants showed more bias when making judgements differentiating 
posed from genuine expressions of happiness than when making the same 
discriminations for sadness. That is, participants were more likely to indicate the 
target was feeling happy (regardless of smile type: posed or genuine) but did not 
demonstrate this tendency for sadness.   
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3.7 Recognition 
 
Percentage of YES responses was not significantly different for familiar faces or 
unfamiliar faces for each emotion. However, YES responses to familiar faces were 
significantly higher than to unfamiliar faces. These scores suggest that the 
participants found the recognition task easy, and since these scores show a ceiling 
effect, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about attention and its impact. 
Percentage YES responses are found in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Percentage of YES Responses in the Recognition task by each Emotion 
 
 
 
 
Emotion Familiar Faces 
(%Yes) 
Unfamiliar Faces 
(%Yes) 
 
Happy 98 0.4 
Sad 97 1 
Neutral 98 0.5 
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Figure 5. Bias towards Identifying Expressions of Happiness in Analysis 2 as a 
Function of Emotion and Condition 
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Recognition scores were also analysed using non-parametric signal detection analysis 
as discussed above. Participant data was collated into hits and false alarms separately 
for each emotion. A hit was defined as responding YES to a face that had been 
present in the emotion categorisation task (a familiar face), while a false alarm was 
defined as responding YES to face that was not present in the emotion categorisation 
task (an unfamiliar face). Sensitivity to familiar faces was not significantly different 
across emotion. 
 
Table 6. Mean Sensitivity and Bias to Familiar Faces in the Recognition task by each 
Emotion 
 
 
3.8 Relationship between Emotion Sensitivity, Depression, Rumination and 
Recognition 
 
Pearson product-moment correlations were computed between depression (DASS-D) 
and rumination (RSQ-R) scores and emotion sensitivity and bias scores. Correlations 
were also computed between recognition sensitivity and emotion sensitivity and bias 
scores. The alpha level of p <.01 was applied to allow for multiple comparisons 
being made. Correlations are shown separately for load vs. non load conditions and 
completed for both analysis 1 (Table 7 & 8) and analysis 2 (Table 9 & 10). 
For Analysis 1, in conditions completed without cognitive load a significant 
correlation was only seen for recognition of sad expressions and sensitivity to 
expressions of sadness in the feel condition ( r (100) = .29, p < .01).  
 
 
Emotion A’ (SD) B” (SD) 
   
Happy 0.97 (.02) 0.34 (.16) 
Sad 0.97 (.02) 0.32(.20) 
Neutral 0.97 (.02) 0.32 (.15) 
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Table 7. Correlations between, DASS-Depression, Rumination, Recognition 
Sensitivity and Emotion Sensitivity and Bias for Conditions without a Cognitive 
Load for Analysis 1 
 A’ Show A’ Feel B” Show B” Feel 
     
Happy     
DASS- Depression .04 .06 -.15 .06 
Rumination -.03 .13 -.05 -.07 
Recognition Happy (A‟) .01 .12 -.00 .10 
Recognition Sad (A‟) -.04 -.04 -.05 -.03 
Recognition Neutral (A‟) -.03 .13 -.09 -.08 
     
Sad     
DASS-Depression -.02 -.14 -04 -.07 
Rumination .04 -.02 -.06 .01 
Recognition Happy (A‟) .04 .12 -.07 -.06 
Recognition Sad (A‟) .06 .29* -.03 -.05 
Recognition Neutral (A‟) .12 .19 -.06 -.04 
Note: Correlations with a * are significant at p < .01 
 
 
Table 8. Correlations between DASS-Depression, Rumination, Recognition 
Sensitivity and Emotion Sensitivity and Bias for Conditions with a Cognitive load 
for Analysis 1 
 A’ Show A’ Feel B” Show B” Feel 
     
Happy     
DASS- Depression .05 .08 .20 .06 
Rumination .06 .11 .05 -.07 
Recognition Happy (A‟) .14 -.07 .12 .10 
Recognition Sad (A‟) -.03 -.07 .10 -.03 
Recognition Neutral (A‟) -.08 -.07 .14 -.07 
     
Sad     
DASS-Depression -.02 -.17 .09 .18 
Rumination .16 -.03 .05 .18 
Recognition Happy (A‟) .08 .15 -.00 -.05 
Recognition Sad (A‟) .20 .25 -.13 .02 
Recognition Neutral (A‟) .11 .09 -.23 -.01 
Note: Correlations with a * are significant at p < .01 
 
For Analysis 2, for conditions completed under cognitive load a significant 
correlation was seen between depression scores and sensitivity in the sad feel 
condition (r (100) = -.28, p < .01).Given the high correlation between the Depression 
and Rumination scores, partial correlations were computed for the significant 
correlation. When impact of rumination scores were partialled out, the correlation 
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between depression scores and sensitivity in the sad feel condition was still 
significant (r (100) = -.31, p < .05). There were no significant correlations between 
depression and rumination scores and recognition sensitivity to any emotions in 
either analysis. 
 
Table 9. Correlations between DASS-Depression, Rumination, Recognition 
Sensitivity and Emotion Sensitivity and Bias for Conditions without a Cognitive 
Load for Analysis 2 
 A’ Show A’ Feel B” Show B” Feel 
     
Happy     
DASS- Depression .06 .06 .05 -.04 
Rumination -.00 .14 .07 -.13 
Recognition Happy (A‟) .05 .13 .12 .10 
Recognition Sad (A‟) -.05 -.03 -.03 -.04 
Recognition Neutral (A‟) -.10 .10 .03 -.00 
     
Sad     
DASS-Depression -.01 -.15 -.01 -.04 
Rumination .04 .01 -.00 -.04 
Recognition Happy (A‟) -.02 -.05 .12 -.04 
Recognition Sad (A‟) -.07 .24 .15 -.04 
Recognition Neutral (A‟) -.03 .16 -.05 -.00 
Note: Correlations with a * are significant at p < .01 
 
Table 10. Correlations between DASS-Depression, Rumination, Recognition 
Sensitivity and Emotion Sensitivity and Bias for Conditions with a Cognitive Load 
for Analysis 2 
 A’ Show A’ Feel B” Show B” Feel 
     
Happy     
DASS- Depression .08 .12 .03 -.04 
Rumination -.01 .19 -.05 -.13 
Recognition Happy (A‟) .07 -.09 -.03 .10 
Recognition Sad (A‟) -.06 -.03 .06 -.04 
Recognition Neutral (A‟) -.10 -.13 .21 -.12 
     
Sad     
DASS-Depression -.15 -.28* .10 .13 
Rumination -.00 -.07 .01 .21 
Recognition Happy (A‟) .12 .08 .13 -.01 
Recognition Sad (A‟) .08 .13 -.16 -.01 
Recognition Neutral (A‟) -.02 .06 -.03 .03 
Note: Correlations with a * are significant at p < .01 
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4. DISCUSSION 
The current research investigated an area of emotion sensitivity that has been 
found to be important for successful social interactions. This being the ability to 
differentiate between facial expressions associated with the experience of emotion 
and those which are not. The focus of the current research was to investigate 
sensitivity to emotion specified in facial expressions across a range of depressive 
symptoms and level of rumination, as both depression and rumination have been 
associated with social dysfunction and have shown deficits in the recognition of 
facial expressions of emotion (e.g. Gur et al., 1992; Hale, 1998; Joormann & Gotlib, 
2006; Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006; Surguladze et al., 2004). The current 
research also investigated the mechanisms suggested by previous literature to 
underlie deficits in emotion recognition; the way in which social information is 
processed (Ambady & Gray, 2002) and selective attention to negative stimuli (e.g. 
Gotlib et al., 2004). The findings of the current research will be discussed in relation 
to each of the factors investigated. The implications of research findings, limitations 
of the current study and directions for future research will also be addressed. 
 
4.1 Relationships between Emotion Sensitivity, Bias, Depression and Rumination 
scores 
Of particular interest to the current research was the relationship between 
emotion sensitivity, bias and depression and rumination scores. Previous research has 
typically compared those diagnosed with depression (experiencing severe symptoms) 
and healthy controls. However, the findings of the current research can be interpreted 
within the context of previous findings as along a continuum of depression scores the 
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scores of healthy individuals and those experiencing severe diagnosed depression are 
included in such a continuum.  
It was predicted that both level of depressive symptoms and rumination 
would be associated with lower sensitivity to differences between posed and genuine 
emotions and higher levels of bias to expressions of sadness. Because depression and 
rumination scores were shown to be highly correlated, this was taken into 
consideration within the relationships found. Depression scores showed a 
relationship with sensitivity when asked if targets were feeling sadness while 
participants were under cognitive load. Higher depression scores were associated 
with lower sensitivity to genuine sadness in this condition. This demonstrated that 
when judging the expressions of sadness, participants with higher levels of 
depressive symptoms were less sensitive to the information specifying affective state. 
This finding is consistent with depressed individuals showing deficits in emotion 
recognition (Persad & Polivy, 1993). This effect was still evident even when 
rumination was controlled for, indicating that depression was having its own unique 
effect. However, that this effect was seen under cognitive load is contrary to the 
prediction of improved sensitivity under distraction. When considering this finding 
we must also consider that a symptom of depression is the experience of cognitive 
difficulties such as diminished ability to concentrate (APA, 2000), and that the 
experience of depression has been shown to affect performance on cognitive tasks 
(for a review see Delgado & Schillerstrom, 2009). In the study conducted by 
Ambady and Gray (2002) examining the effect of cognitive load, the sample 
included participants with induced sad mood and while a major feature of depression, 
since sad mood was induced by the experimenters perceivers may not have 
experienced the cognitive symptoms associated with depression. In depression 
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cognitive deficits may cause difficulty in completing tasks when under increased 
cognitive demand and in turn have a detrimental effect on the performance of tasks 
being completed. This effect may only been seen for expressions of sadness, as those 
experiencing depressive symptoms show preoccupation with these expressions 
(Gotlib et al., 2004). When distracted, participants experiencing depressive 
symptoms may be more likely to identify any approximation of sadness as specifying 
affective state.  While depression scores were not correlated with errors in the 
cognitive distraction task, this could imply that the cognitive load task was successful 
in distracting participants from the stimuli in the emotion categorisation task. 
Rumination was not significantly related to sensitivity or bias as predicted; 
this was unexpected due to the previous research findings concerning rumination, 
emotion recognition and social judgements (Johnston, Carter & McLellan, in press; 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen Hoeksema, 1995; Raes, Hermans, & Williams, 2006). 
Rumination has previously been seen to have a significant effect on the perception of 
facial expressions, even when depression scores were controlled for (Raes, Hermans, 
& Williams, 2006). Rumination has also been associated with a perceptual bias 
towards negative information (Lyubomirsky & Nolen Hoeksema, 1995). Rumination 
was also shown to have an effect on sensitivity to affective state specified in 
expressions of sadness (Johnston, Carter & McLellan, in press). As rumination is a 
response to depressive symptoms, it was expected that rumination effects would be 
tied to depressive symptoms. Rumination may have a more evident effect on 
attention, due to the analytical thinking style associated with it. However, that 
rumination was not associated with attention in the current research study may be 
due to the measures of attention used, which are discussed further below.  
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4.2 Relationship between Recognition Sensitivity and Other Factors 
In the recognition task, sensitivity to familiar faces was very high, and there 
was no difference in recognition across emotions. Across emotions participants 
showed near perfect rates of recognition of faces from the emotion sensitivity task. 
Since recognition rates were essentially at a ceiling any relationships found need to 
be considered carefully. 
 There was a relationship between recognition of sad expressions and emotion 
sensitivity when asked if targets were feeling sadness while completing the task 
without cognitive load; higher recognition of sad expressions being associated with 
higher sensitivity when asked to make judgements about what targets were feeling. A 
possible explanation for this finding is that for expressions of sadness, attending 
more to the facial displays may lead to improved sensitivity. Since expressions of 
sadness have less defined differences in terms of posed and genuine expressions of 
emotion (Mclellan et al., 2010), more attention paid to these expressions could 
possibly lead to improved sensitivity to the emotional state of targets.    
Recognition sensitivity was not found to be directly related to depression and 
rumination scores as predicted and specific biases of attention related to these 
variables were not found. This may be due to the lack of sensitivity of the methods 
used to measure attention in the current research. However, considering recognition 
as a measure of attention paid during the emotion categorisation task, higher levels of 
recognition (and by proxy, attention) of sadness was shown to be related to higher 
emotion sensitivity, but only for expressions of sadness. 
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4.3 Emotion Sensitivity 
 The current research also investigated the sensitivity of perceivers to the 
differences between facial expressions of emotion (happiness & sadness) that were 
associated with a congruent emotional experience, and those that were not. 
Perceivers were shown to be sensitive to information specifying the experience of 
emotion (genuine expressions) from expressions that did not (posed and neutral 
expressions) and also sensitive the differences between posed and genuine 
expressions of emotion. All sensitivity scores found in the current research were 
greater than chance levels, in line with previous research (Frank et al., 1993; 
Johnston, Carter & McLellan, in press, Miles & Johnston, 2007; McLellan et al., 
2010).   
Firstly sensitivity to facial expressions associated with emotional experience 
(genuine expressions) and expressions which are not (posed and neutral expressions) 
will be considered. When making judgements without a cognitive load participants 
showed higher levels of sensitivity to expressions of happiness in the feel condition 
over the show condition, showing higher sensitivity when explicitly asked to attend 
to the emotional experience of targets over when asked to attend to the display of 
emotion, consistent with previous research findings (Johnston, Carter & McLellan, in 
press, Miles & Johnston, 2007; McLellan et al., 2010). When experiencing cognitive 
load, sensitivity to expressions of happiness did not differ as a function of what 
participants were instructed to attend to, indicating that sensitivity was not higher 
when asked to explicitly attend to emotional state in this case. This finding was 
contrary to what was predicted, as cognitive load was expected to either improve 
sensitivity or not have a significant effect on judgements, as has been shown in 
previous studies (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Tracey & Robins, 2008). Sensitivity to 
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expressions of sadness showed no effects of condition or load, with participants 
employing similar criteria across conditions. Participants displayed higher levels of 
sensitivity to the emotional experience of happiness compared to sadness. This 
finding of higher levels of sensitivity to expressions of happiness is consistent with 
previous studies (Calder et al., 2003; Gosselin et al., 1995; Johnston, Carter & 
McLellan, in press; McLellan et al., 2010). That perceivers were more sensitive to 
happiness, could be related to these expressions having several distinct markers of 
felt emotion compared to expressions of sadness which have fewer distinct markers.   
When considering sensitivity of perceivers to the differences between posed 
and genuine expressions, participants showed greater sensitivity to expressions of 
genuine happiness when asked what participants were feeling over what they were 
showing, demonstrating again higher sensitivity when explicitly asked to attend to 
emotional state. This pattern was found in both load conditions. This showed that 
perceivers are sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine expressions of 
happiness regardless of distraction, while cognitive load had an effect on the 
sensitivity to expressions that specify the affective state of happiness over those that 
do not.  
When comparing performance under cognitive load to no load participants 
showed higher sensitivity to genuine happiness when asked what targets were 
showing. When asked if targets were actually feeling happy there was no difference 
in sensitivity across load conditions. For expressions of sadness, participants showed 
greater sensitivity in the feel condition over the show condition in both load 
conditions. Indicating that cognitive load only showed an effect on sensitivity to the 
differences between posed and genuine emotions when asked if targets were showing 
happiness. 
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Cognitive load was used as a technique to prevent intentional processing of 
stimuli by distracting participants from this kind of processing. The effects of 
performing the task without a cognitive load were in line with previous research as 
discussed above. These findings indicated that perceivers were sensitive to the 
information in facial expressions which specify an underlying affective state, and 
would then be able to use this information in social interactions. However in 
conditions where the experience of cognitive load showed contrasting effects to 
performing the task with no load, results were contrary to predicted and not in line 
with previous research (Ambady & Gray, 2002, Tracey & Robins, 2008). Compared 
to no load conditions, the main difference when participants were under cognitive 
load was that higher levels of sensitivity were not seen when making judgements 
about target faces when specifically asked to attend to affective state. This contrast 
indicates that the distraction of a cognitive task may actually impair sensitivity to 
underlying emotional state. Previously when asked to label expressions of emotion, 
perceivers have been shown to be unaffected by cognitive load (Tracey & Robins, 
2008), however this task of labelling emotions may be more familiar to participants 
than being asked to explicitly identify if expressions are associated with affective 
state. Social judgements have been shown to be improved by distraction as it 
prevents deliberate processing of information (Ambady & Gray, 2002). In the current 
research participants were asked to make explicit judgements about targets, however 
in social situations judgements are not normally made in an explicit manner 
(Ambady & Gray, 2002). A possible reason then why cognitive load did not have the 
predicted effect could be that participants were asked to make judgements that are 
normally made in an implicit manner explicitly.     
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4.4 Bias 
Participants showed higher levels of response bias towards expressions of 
happiness than sadness, as has been found previously (Johnston, Carter & McLellan, 
in press). Participants also showed more conservative judgements when asked what 
targets were feeling than when asked what targets were showing with bias scores 
being higher in the latter condition, which was also consistent with previous research 
(Johnston, Carter & McLellan, in press; McLellan et al., 2010; Miles & Johnston, 
2007). This bias indicates that when participants were asked to specifically attend to 
affective state there is a reduction in responding that expressions display emotion. 
This reduction indicates more conservative criteria are being employed in making 
judgements. 
In terms of bias scores in differentiating between posed and genuine 
emotions, participants showed more bias towards expressions of happiness over 
sadness when asked what targets were feeling, however biases towards expression of 
happiness and sadness did not differ when asked what participants were showing. 
When asked to explicitly attend to affective state participants showed more bias 
towards expressions of happiness, however when asked what targets were 
expressing, participants did not show more bias towards expressions of  happiness 
than sadness. Hence a higher response bias towards expressions of happiness is only 
evident when participants were asked to identify genuine expressions of emotion, 
rather than when asked to complete the simpler task of identifying what emotion is 
being expressed. Participants then appear to only apply more conservative criteria 
when asked to specifically attend to affective state.    
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4.5 Implications 
 Social dysfunction is an important aspect of the impairments experienced in 
depression. Impairments in emotion recognition have been associated with social 
dysfunction (Leppenen & Hietanen, 2001). Research concerning emotion sensitivity 
and how depressive symptoms are related to impairments in this area allow us to 
better understand depression as a disorder. The current findings indicate a 
relationship between cognitive processes and impairments in emotion sensitivity, 
suggesting further areas warranting investigation. As rumination is a cognitive 
response to depressive symptoms, this factor is an important one to consider in 
relation to the cognitive processes in depression and how this relates to emotion 
sensitivity. These factors have implications for the focus of therapy in those with 
depression to address social deficits, such as examining cognitive processes and 
addressing unhelpful response styles such as rumination. Addressing the mechanisms 
behind social deficits in therapy would allow for those experiencing depressive 
symptoms to engage in more successful social interactions.   
The task in the current study was looking at the ability of perceivers to attend 
to differences specifying felt and unfelt emotions, rather than identifying what 
emotions were being displayed as has been the case in previous studies. This is a 
different aspect of emotion sensitivity that is fundamental to successful social 
interactions. The difference in what information perceivers are asked to attend to 
may be why depressive symptoms were associated with a different pattern of 
impairments in emotion sensitivity in the current research. Also higher bias towards 
expressions of sadness compared to happiness, which has been typically shown in 
those with depressive symptoms, may not be displayed as a prominent effect in this 
task. Instead less discrimination between genuine and posed expressions of sadness 
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was displayed. This may indicate that when asked to attend to affective state, those 
experiencing higher levels of depressive symptoms show a tendency to identify any 
expression related to sadness as experiencing sadness, and not show this tendency for 
expressions of happiness.  
The current research used ecologically relevant stimuli in order to investigate 
a specific aspect of emotion sensitivity. This allows the effects of depressive 
symptoms and level of rumination on emotion sensitivity in the social environment 
to be more clearly examined, by using stimuli which are a closer approximation to 
those actually experienced in everyday interactions. Using more ecologically 
relevant stimuli may be useful in uncovering impairments in emotion sensitivity that 
may not be discovered by using schematic or purely posed expressions. The current 
research indicated that impairments in being sensitive to affective state may be 
different to labelling emotional expressions, and in turn indicated areas of focus in 
treatment as discussed above. 
 
4.6 Limitations of the Current Research and Directions for Future Research  
 One of the aims of the current research was to include participants with a 
range of depressive symptoms in order to examine a trend in emotion sensitivity. 
While a wide range of depression scores was achieved, scores were still negatively 
skewed to lower levels of depressive symptoms. The number of participants with 
depression scores in the more severe ranges was in fact similar to Johnston, Carter & 
McLellan (in press). A greater number of depression scores in the more severe range 
may have allowed for the effect of depressive symptoms on sensitivity to underlying 
affective state to be more clearly seen. Many previous studies have focused on group 
differences between those diagnosed with depression and non depressed controls. 
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This group design may display the deficits in depression more clearly, as 
comparisons are being made between two distinct groups in terms of depressive 
severity. As a depression diagnosis indicates a high level of symptom severity, 
comparing this high severity to healthy controls could allow a greater contrast to be 
seen. In the current research the focus was to examine deficits across a range of 
depressive symptoms rather than group differences; however, it did not include 
confirmation of a diagnosis of depression in those with more severe depressive 
symptoms. Future research focused on a sample with a wide range of depression 
scores including those with a confirmed diagnosis, indicating a high level of 
symptom severity causing significant impairments in everyday functioning, may 
better examine trends in emotion sensitivity deficits. 
 In the current research perceivers were asked to make explicit judgements 
about the emotional state of targets. While explicit judgements allow conclusions 
about sensitivity to be drawn, this may not reflect actual behaviour in social 
interactions (where judgements are more likely to be made outside conscious 
awareness (Ambady & Gray, 2002)). Future research including a task that examined 
the influence of sensitivity on behaviour may be used to display the effects of 
depressive symptoms and rumination. In studies investigating sensitivity to affective 
state and the effect of subsequent behaviour, tasks which have been used included 
priming tasks (Miles & Johnston, 2007; McLellan et al., 2010) or investigated the 
effect of posed versus genuine expressions on product preference (Peace et al., 
2006). These tasks do not ask perceivers to label emotions explicitly; instead they are 
required to make other judgements which emotional displays may affect, this is a 
closer approximation to what occurs in real world social interactions.  
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Considering the recognition task, it appears the requirements of the task were 
too easy and failed to discriminate a trend in regards to depressive symptoms, 
rumination and did not allow any inferences about attention to be made regarding 
these variables. Each individual target was viewed by participants a total of four 
times; this repeated exposure to stimuli may have facilitated the high levels of 
recognition of faces present in the emotion sensitivity task. If differences in attention 
are more subtle in nature, a more sensitive measure would be needed to identify the 
effects of depressive symptoms and rumination on attention. Previously in the 
literature attention has been measured by presenting stimuli simultaneously and 
measuring selective attention (e.g. Gotlib et al., 2004). Future research could 
endeavour to incorporate such tasks in research designs in order to investigate 
attention and emotion sensitivity. The current research employed a within subjects 
design, as mentioned above this resulted in participants being exposed to target 
stimuli multiple times. A between subjects design comparing across load conditions 
would reduce the number of times participants were exposed to targets. In order to 
employ such a design a very large number of participants would be needed which 
was outside the scope of this research. 
 
4.7 Conclusions  
The ability to recognise different facial expressions is a critical skill for 
effective social interaction. Posed and genuine emotions represent an aspect of 
emotion perception in social interactions that can have an effect on the success of 
these interactions. Individuals with deficits in this ability may suffer negative 
outcomes which may result in social dysfunction and ultimately social isolation. The 
current research findings suggest there is some relationship between depression and 
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impairments and the ability to differentiate between posed and genuine expressions 
of emotion, particularly sadness. The associations between rumination and 
depressive symptoms need further investigation, especially as rumination is 
associated with cognitive processes. In terms of mechanisms behind emotion 
sensitivity, cognitive processes are an area for further investigation. Future research 
in this area could uncover more prominent and relevant effects with the suggested 
improvements on the current methodology.  
Gaining a clearer understanding of emotion sensitivity deficits will lead to a 
clearer understanding of depression, rumination and avenues of exploration in 
therapy to address social difficulties. Improving social functioning in individuals 
experiencing depressive symptoms will aid in improving the quality of life that they 
experience. 
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Appendix A:  Participant Recruitment notice 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                            
Would you like to be part of a research project being 
conducted by researchers at the University of Canterbury? 
We are looking for people to participate in research looking 
at recognising emotion in facial expressions. 
 
 
You will be asked to complete some pen and paper questionnaires and you 
will also be asked to complete a computer task. Participation takes 
approximately 20-30 minutes and you will receive a $10 petrol voucher. 
For more information and if you are interested in participating please contact 
the researcher using the details below to arrange an appointment. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facial 
Expression 
Study 
cla4
9
@
u
cliv
e.ac.n
z 
P
h
o
n
e: (0
3
) 3
6
6
7
0
0
1
 ex
t. 7
1
9
0
 
Facial 
Expression 
Study 
cla4
9
@
u
cliv
e.ac.n
z 
P
h
o
n
e: (0
3
) 3
6
6
7
0
0
1
 ex
t. 7
1
9
0
 
Facial 
Expression 
Study 
cla4
9
@
u
cliv
e.ac.n
z 
P
h
o
n
e: (0
3
) 3
6
6
7
0
0
1
 ex
t. 7
1
9
0
 
Facial 
Expression 
Study 
cla4
9
@
u
cliv
e.ac.n
z 
P
h
o
n
e: (0
3
) 3
6
6
7
0
0
1
 ex
t. 7
1
9
0
 
Facial 
Expression 
Study 
cla4
9
@
u
cliv
e.ac.n
z 
P
h
o
n
e: (0
3
) 3
6
6
7
0
0
1
 ex
t. 7
1
9
0
 
Facial 
Expression 
Study 
cla4
9
@
u
cliv
e.ac.n
z 
P
h
o
n
e: (0
3
) 3
6
6
7
0
0
1
 ex
t. 7
1
9
0
 
75 
 
Appendix B: Instruction Sheet 
 
Instruction Sheet 
 
Welcome to the computer tasks. In these tasks we are looking at the ability of people 
to identify the emotional states of others from looking at their facial expressions.  
We are interested whether people can tell whether another person is actually 
FEELING the emotion that they are SHOWING on their face. This is based on the 
idea that sometimes we can SHOW (or display) an emotion without actually 
FEELING (or experiencing) it, while other times we can FEEL (or experience) an 
emotion without actually SHOWING (or displaying) it.  
For example, sometimes if you meet someone you don‟t particularly like you might 
still smile politely. In this situation you would be trying to SHOW (or display) 
happiness (by smiling) even though you weren‟t actually FEELING (or 
experiencing) happy.  
In these tasks photographs of people will appear on the computer screen one at a 
time. On some trials we will ask you to judge what emotion the person is 
SHOWING, and other times what emotion the person is FEELING, but I will tell 
you each time.  
You‟ll only need to judge one emotion (HAPPINESS or SADNESS) at a time, but 
again I will tell you which one to concentrate on. You may see a number of pictures 
of the same person but try and consider each picture separately. 
There are nine questions (blocks of photographs) in the task. Your job is to answer 
the question for each photograph by pressing A for YES or L for NO. For example, 
the first question might ask,  
 “Is following person SHOWING happiness?”  
 
You will press A key if you think YES they are showing happiness, or 
You will press the L key if you think NO they are not showing happiness 
The next question might ask,  
 “Is the following person FEELING happiness?”  
 
You will press the A key if you think YES they are actually feeling happiness, or 
You will press the L key if you think NO they are not actually feeling happiness.  
 
At the beginning of some questions (blocks of photographs) you will see a 7 digit 
number and you will be asked to remember this number and recall it to the 
experimenter at the end of the block. The instructions will let you know when it is a 
trial that you have to remember a number, and I will also remind you. 
Each question (block) will begin with a short practice. Please read and follow the 
instructions on the screen 
 
Please feel free to ask me any questions 
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Appendix C: Information Sheet 
 
Information Sheet 
Recognising Facial expressions of Emotion 
 
You are invited to take part in a study being conducted by researchers at 
the University of Canterbury. The project is being carried out as part of 
the requirements for a Master‟s thesis by Charlene Lang, under the 
supervision of Professor Lucy Johnston, Dr Janet Carter, & Dr Tracy 
McLellan. 
 
We are interested in the relationship between people‟s thinking styles 
and their emotions and their perception of emotions in others. The 
researchers are interested in looking at relationships between responses 
to questionnaires about how people feel about themselves, mood, 
responding to events and responses to the tasks in the current study.  
 
General Information 
Your involvement in the study will take approximately 20-30 
minutes and will be conducted at the University of Canterbury. We will 
give you some paper and pen questionnaires to complete that ask 
questions about how you feel about yourself and how you respond to life 
events and mood.  We will then show you several photographs of people 
on a computer screen and ask you to respond to some questions about the 
people you see by pressing buttons on a keyboard. During some of the 
computer tasks, you will also be asked to complete some simple mental 
exercises, such as remembering a number during the task. 
 
Confidentiality 
 The information you provide in this study will not be connected to 
your name, rather it will be coded by number to ensure the anonymity 
and confidentiality of the data. The data will be available only to the 
researchers. We will keep all coded information securely stored during 
the study and are required to safely archive this information once the 
study is completed.  
 
Information regarding the findings of this study 
 The results of this study may be published but you will not be 
identified as a participant. You can request a summary of the results of 
this study although it may take some time for us to collect and analyze 
all of the data.  
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If any health concerns arise in the course of this study you may wish to 
discuss this information with your GP. However, information will not be 
passed to your GP without your consent. 
 
Support Person 
 You are invited to bring a partner/friend /family member or 
support person with you. An adjacent room will be available for them to 
wait if you desire.   
 
Participation 
Your participation in this study is voluntary (your choice). You do 
not have to take part in this study, and you may choose to withdraw from 
the study at any time, without having to give any reason.  Choosing to 
withdraw from the study will not result in any negative outcomes for 
you. 
 
Reimbursement 
 We appreciate the time and effort required to participate in 
research and although we are unable to provide cash to participants, we 
can compensate you with a $10 voucher as thanks for participation.  
 
Please speak to the researcher if you have any further questions before 
participation 
 
Please contact one of the researchers below if you have any queries or 
concerns about this study. 
 
Contact details 
Charlene Lang, University of Canterbury, Phone: 364 2987 extn. 7190; 
Email: charlene.lang@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
Professor Lucy Johnston, University of Canterbury,  
Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 6967 
Dr Janet Carter, University of Canterbury, Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 
8090 
Dr Tracey McLellan, University of Canterbury,  
Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 3632 
 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the Upper South B 
Regional Ethics Committee, ethics reference number URB/10/04/016 
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Appendix D: Consent Form 
 
Consent Form 
Recognising Facial Expressions of Emotion 
 
I have read and understand the information sheet for people volunteering 
to participate in the above named study. I have had the opportunity to 
discuss this study and I am satisfied with the answers I have been given. 
I have had the opportunity to use a support person to help me ask any 
questions and understand the study. I have had time to consider whether 
to take part in this study. 
 
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) and 
that I may withdraw from the study at any time, for any reason without 
any consequences. 
 
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and no 
information that could identify me will be used in any reports generated 
on this study. 
 
I agree to my GP being informed of the results of my participation in this 
study Please check:  Yes    No 
 
Print name:__________________________________________________ 
 
Participant‟s signature:_______________________________________ 
 
Date: _________________________ 
 
Project Explained By:__________________________________ 
 
Project Role : _________________________________________ 
 
Date : _________________________ 
 
Contact details of researchers: 
Charlene Lang Phone: 364 2987 extn. 7190;  
Professor Lucy Johnston, Phone (03) 3642967 
Dr Janet Carter, Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 8090 
Dr Tracey McLellan, Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 3632 
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Appendix E: Participant Questionnaire Booklet 
 
Demographic Data 
(Today‟s Date:                        ) 
  
Age: 
 
Sex (Circle one):  
 
1 Female  
 
2 Male 
  
Number of Years of Education (including Tertiary): 
 
Ethnicity of participant 
Which ethnic group do you belong to? 
Please circle the one(s) or enter another that applies to you. 
 
 1 New Zealand European  
 
 2 Māori  
 
 3 Samoan  
 
 4 Cook Island Māori  
 
 5 Tongan  
 
 6 Niuean  
 
 7 Chinese  
 
 8 Indian  
 
 9 OTHER Please state: 
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DASS 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which 
indicates how much the statement applied to you over the past week. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time 
on any statement. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0 Did not apply to me at all 
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2 Applied to me a considerable degree, or a good part of the time 
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1. I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things 0 1 2 3 
      
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0 1 2 3 
      
3. I couldn‟t seem to experience any positive feeling at 
all 
0 1 2 3 
      
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g. excessively 
rapid breathing, breathlessness in the absence of 
physical exertion) 
 
0 1 2 3 
5. I just couldn‟t seem to get going 0 1 2 3 
      
6. I tended to over-react to situations 0 1 2 3 
 
7. I had a feeling of shakiness (e.g. legs going to give 
way) 
0 1 2 3 
      
8. I found it difficult to relax 0 1 2 3 
 
9. I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I 
was most relieved when they ended 
 
0 1 2 3 
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0 1 2 3 
      
11. I found myself getting upset rather easily 0 1 2 3 
 
12. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0 1 2 3 
 
13. I felt sad and depressed 0 1 2 3 
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14. I found myself getting inpatient when I was delayed in 
any way (e.g. lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting) 
 
0 1 2 3 
15. I had feelings of faintness 0 1 2 3 
 
16. I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything 0 1 2 3 
      
17. I felt I wasn‟t worth much as a person 0 1 2 3 
 
18. I felt that I was rather touchy 0 1 2 3 
      
19. I perspired noticeably (e.g. hands sweaty) in the 
absence of high temperatures or physical exertion 
 
0 1 2 3 
20. I felt scared without any good reason 0 1 2 3 
 
21. I felt that life wasn‟t worth while 0 1 2 3 
 
22. I found it hard to wind down 0 1 2 3 
      
23. I had difficulty in swallowing 0 1 2 3 
 
24. I couldn‟t seem to get any enjoyment out of the things 
I did 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
25. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of 
physical exertion (e.g. sense of heart rate increase, 
heart missing a beat) 
 
0 1 2 3 
26. I felt down-hearted and blue 0 1 2 3 
 
27. I found that I was very irritable 0 1 2 3 
      
28. I felt I was close to panic 0 1 2 3 
 
29. I found it hard to calm down after something upset me 0 1 2 3 
 
30. I feared that I would be “thrown” by some trivial but 
unfamiliar task 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
31. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0 1 2 3 
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32. I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I 
was doing 
 
0 1 2 3 
 
33. I was in a state of nervous tension 0 1 2 3 
      
34. I felt I was pretty worthless 0 1 2 3 
 
35. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting 
on with what I was doing 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
36. I felt terrified 0 1 2 3 
 
37. I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about 0 1 2 3 
 
38. I felt that life was meaningless 0 1 2 3 
 
39. I found myself getting agitated 0 1 2 3 
 
40. I was worried about situations in which I might panic 
and make a fool of myself 
 
0 1 2 3 
 
41. I experienced trembling (e.g. in the hands) 0 1 2 3 
 
42. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do 
things 
0 1 2 3 
 
 
 
RSQ-R 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed.  
Please read each of the items below and indicate whether you never, 
sometimes, often, or always think or do each one when you feel 
down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not 
what you think you should do. Please circle one.  
 
            
1) I think about my feelings of fatigue and achiness   
 never    sometimes  often    always  
 
2) I think about how passive and unmotivated I feel 
never    sometimes  often    always 
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3) I think “I won‟t be able to do my job/work because I feel so 
badly” 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
4) I think about how I don‟t feel up to doing anything 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
5) I think about how hard it is to concentrate 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
6) I think about how alone I feel 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
7) I think about how I  don‟t seem to feel anything any more 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
8) I go someplace alone to think about my feelings 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
9) I isolate myself and think about the reasons why I feel sad 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
 
10) I go away by myself and think about why I feel this way 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
      11) I write down what I am thinking about and analyze it 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
      12) I listen to sad music 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
      13) I think “Why do I always react this way?” 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
      14) I think about a recent situation wishing it had gone better 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
      15) I think about how angry I am with myself 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
      16) I try to understand myself by focusing on my depressed feelings 
never    sometimes  often    always 
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17) I analyse my personality to try and understand why I am 
depressed 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
       18) I analyse recent events to try and understand why I am depressed 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
       19) I think about all my shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
       20) I think about how sad I feel 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
       21) I think “Why can‟t I get going?” 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
       22) I think “Why do I have problems other people don‟t have?” 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
       23) I think “Why can‟t I handle things better?” 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
24)  I think “I won‟t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this 
way.” 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
       25) I think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 
never    sometimes  often    always 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaires, please return your 
completed forms to the researcher and you will proceed to the next part 
of the study. 
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Appendix F: Debriefing Form 
 
Debriefing Form 
Recognising Facial expressions of Emotion 
 
 Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study, below is 
some information about the study, which the researcher will go over with 
you. If you have any questions or need any clarification please do not 
hesitate to ask the researcher.  
This study examined whether or not there is a relationship 
between people‟s mood and emotions in terms of symptoms of 
depression, their thinking style in terms of levels of rumination and the 
ability to tell the difference between posed and genuine expression of 
emotions . Rumination is the repetitive focus on problems in one‟s life 
and dwelling on the negative impact of these problems. A genuine 
expression of emotion is one where the person is feeling the emotion that 
they are displaying in their facial expression, while for a posed 
expression the person displays an emotion on their face but is not 
actually experiencing/feeling that emotion (e.g., smiling despite not 
actually feeling happy).  
This study also examined two mechanisms that might explain the 
relationship between depressive symptoms, rumination and the detection 
of emotion. One of these mechanisms is intentional processing of social 
information. The other mechanism is inattention to social information. 
 We are predicting that levels of depressive symptoms and 
rumination will effect people‟s ability to tell the difference between 
posed and genuine facial expressions of emotion. Specifically higher 
levels of depressive symptoms and/or rumination will be associated with 
poorer ability to differentiate between posed and genuine expression of 
happiness but greater ability to differentiate between genuine and posed 
expressions of sadness. We are also predicting that the two mechanisms 
will show underlying relationships with both symptoms of depression 
and levels of rumination.   
We used computer tasks asking participants to make judgements 
about facial photographs to measure emotion perception. To measure 
depressive symptoms and level of rumination we used self report 
questionnaires. 
We looked at the underlying mechanisms two different ways. To 
look at intentional processing, we attempted to prevent this processing 
by giving participants a mental task (remembering a number) during the 
faces task. We are predicting when performing the task under this 
condition, we will not see significant relationships between depression, 
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rumination and the ability to differentiate between posed and genuine 
expressions of emotion.   
To look at inattention to social information we asked participants 
to complete a recognition exercise. In the recognition exercise there were 
faces that were present in the experimental task (familiar faces) and faces 
that were not (unfamiliar faces), participants were asked to identify 
which faces were familiar. We are predicting that those with higher 
levels of depression and/or rumination will have poorer recognition of 
facial expressions of happiness, but a greater ability to recognise facial 
expressions of sadness. 
This research may allow us to better understand emotion 
perception and the impact rumination and depressive symptoms have on 
emotional awareness processes.  
You can request a summary of the results of this study from the 
researchers although it may take some time for us to collect and analyse 
all of the data. If you have any further questions please contact the 
researcher. 
 
 
Contact details 
Charlene Lang, University of Canterbury, Phone: 364 2987 extn. 7190;  
Email: charlene.lang@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
Professor Lucy Johnston, University of Canterbury,  
Phone (03) 3642967  
Dr Janet Carter, University of Canterbury, Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 
8090 
Dr Tracey McLellan, University of Canterbury,  
Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 3632 
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Appendix G: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) analyses for percentage YES 
responses 
 
A 2 (Cognitive load: no load/load) x 3 (Emotion: happy/sad) x 2 (Condition: 
show/feel) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) repeated measures ANOVAs 
displayed main effects of Condition, F (1, 99) = 76.71, p < 0.001, 2p = .440 and 
Expression, F (2, 198) = p < .001, 2p = .899. These main effects were qualified by 
significant Emotion by Expression, F (2, 198) = 164.10, p < .001, 2p = .636 and 
Condition by Expression F (2, 198) = 97.920, p < .001, 2p  = .499 interactions, there 
was also significant Load by Emotion by Condition F (1, 199) = 4.10, p < .05, 2p  = 
.040, Load by Condition by Expression F (2, 198) = 5.41, p < .01, 2p  = .052, and 
Emotion by Condition by Expression F (2, 198) = 3.73, p < .05, 2p  = .037 three 
way interactions. A significant four way interaction was found F (2, 198) = 3.75, p < 
.05, 2p = .038 
 
In light of the revealed 3 and 4 way interactions a separate 2 (Cognitive Load: no 
load/load) x 2 (Condition: show/fee) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) 
repeated measures ANOVAs was conducted for each emotion. For happiness, 
analysis displayed main effects of Condition F (1, 99) = 68.07, p < .01, 2p = .410 
and Expression F (2,198) = 1374.80, p < .01, 2p = .933 these were qualified by 
significant Load by Condition F (1, 99) = 6.51, p < .05, 2p = .062 and Condition by 
Expression F (2,198) = 86.79, p < .001, 2p = .470 interactions. A significant three 
way interaction was also found F (2,198) = 10.85, p < .01, 2p = .100.  
In light of the 3 way interaction in the analysis for happiness, separate 2 (Load: no 
load/load) x 2 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) repeated measures ANOVAs 
were conducted. For the show condition, analysis displayed main effects of Load F 
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(1, 99) = 5.90, p < .01,2p  =.057 and Expression F (2,198) = 1418.83, p < .01, 
2
p  = 
.935 these were qualified by a significant interaction F (2,198) = 7.96, p < .01, 2p = 
.075 which is shown in Figure 6. Post-hoc tests (Tukey, p < .05) were conducted to 
investigate the interaction. In both load conditions sensitivity to genuine expressions 
was significantly higher than posed expressions, with both being higher than for 
neutral expressions. Therefore, genuine expressions were judged as being happy in 
both the show and feel condition equally as often, while posed expressions were only 
judged as happy more often when asked if targets were showing happiness, then 
when asked if participants were feeling happy. The interaction revealed no 
significant difference in the percentage of YES responses to happiness in the no load 
and load conditions for either genuine (M = 95% vs. 95.5%), or neutral (M = 7.5% 
vs. 7.4%) expressions. There were, however, more YES responses to posed 
expressions in the no load than the load (M = 90.8% vs. 83.3%) condition. When 
participants completed the task without being under cognitive load there was not a 
significant difference between percentage YES responses to genuine and posed 
expressions (M = 95% vs. 90.8%), but both were significantly higher than neutral 
expressions. When completing the task under a cognitive load YES responses to 
genuine expressions were significantly higher than responses for posed, and both 
were significantly higher than neutral expressions. In the show condition while under 
a cognitive load participants showed more discrimination between posed and genuine 
expressions as displaying happiness. 
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For happiness in the feel condition analysis displayed main effects of Expression F 
(2,198) = 548.31, p < .001, 2p =.847 which was qualified by an interaction F (2,198) 
= 3.58, p < .05, 2p = .030 which is shown in Figure 7. Post-hoc tests (Tukey, p < 
.05) were conducted to investigate the interaction. In both load conditions YES 
responses to emotion to genuine expressions was significantly higher than posed 
expressions, with both being higher than for neutral expressions. The interaction 
revealed no significant difference in the percentage of YES responses to happiness in 
either load condition for genuine (M = 94.1% vs. 92.8%), or neutral (M = 9.1% vs. 
9.3%) expressions. However, there were more YES responses to posed expressions 
in the load condition compared to the no load condition (M = 56.4% vs. 51.3%). 
While under a cognitive load participants made more judgements of posed 
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Figure 6. Percentage YES Responses to Happiness as a Function of Expression Type 
and Load in the Show Condition. 
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expressions as feeling happiness than when completing the task without a cognitive 
load. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For sadness, analysis displayed main effects of Condition F (1, 99) = 40.57, p < .001, 
2p = .291 and Expression F (2,198) = 197.03, p < .001, 
2
p = .666, these were 
qualified by a significant Condition by Expression interaction F (2,198) = 51.56, p < 
.001, 2p = .342 which is shown in Figure 8. Post-hoc tests (Tukey, p < .05) were 
conducted to investigate the interaction. The interaction revealed significant 
difference in the percentage of YES responses to sadness in the show and feel 
conditions for genuine (M = 83.6% vs. 75.8%) and posed (M = 70.5% vs. 41.4%) 
expressions. There was no significant difference in YES responses to neutral (M = 
31.4% vs. 35%) expressions in the show and feel conditions. In the both the show 
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Figure 7. Percentage YES Responses to Happiness as a Function of Expression Type 
and Load in the Feel Condition. 
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and feel conditions the percentage YES responses to genuine expressions were 
significantly higher than posed expressions and both were significantly higher than 
neutral expressions. Participants more often judged genuine expressions as both 
showing and feeling sadness but posed emotions as only showing the emotion.  
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Figure 8. Percentage YES Responses to Sadness as a Function of Expression Type and 
Condition 
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Appendix H: Formulae used for calculation of sensitivity and bias 
 
Sensitivity (A‟): 
• For H ≥ FA: A‟ = 0.5 + [(H – FA)(1 + H – FA)] / [4H(1-FA)] 
• For FA > H: A‟ = 0.5 - [(FA – H)(1 + FA – H)] / [4FA(1-H)] 
 
Response bias (B”): 
• For H ≥ FA: B” = [H (1 - H) – FA(1 - FA)] / [(H (1 - H) + FA(1 - FA)] 
• For FA > H: B” = [FA(1 - FA) – H(1 - H)] / [(FA (1 - FA) + H(1 - H)] 
 
H = hit rate, and FA = false alarm rate. 
 
